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Tässä diplomityössä tutkitaan ydinvoimalaitoksen laitteille todennäköisyyspohjaista
riskianalyysiä (PRA) hyödyntämällä laskettavia riskitärkeysmittoja ja vertaillaan niiden
arvoja laitteiden turvallisuusluokkiin, jotka ovat määritetty perustuen pääosin
deterministisiin ohjeisiin suomalaisissa ydinturvallisuusohjeissa. Suomessa on käytössä
neljä turvallisuusluokkaa: TL1, TL2, TL3 ja EYT. Useat komponentille asetettavat
vaatimukset riippuvat turvallisuusluokasta.
PRA-mallilla mallinnetaan kuinka reaktorin vaurioituminen  tai päästön leviämisen
estämisen epäonnistuminen riippuu pienemmistä tapahtumista. Mallin tarkimmalla
tasolla on kahden eri tyypin tapahtumia: perustapahtumia ja alkutapahtumia.
Alkutapahtumat ovat poikkeamia laitoksen normaalista toiminnasta ja jotka vaativat
turvallisuustoimintojen käynnistämistä. Perustapahtumat kuvaavat vikaantumisia, jotka
mahdollistavat turvallisuustoiminnon epäonnistumisen. Laskentaohjelmistolla voidaan
määrittää alku- ja perustapahtumajoukkoja joiden samanaikainen ilmeneminen voi
aiheuttaa reaktorin vaurioitumisen ja voidaan laskea sydänvaurioitumistaajuus.
Mallin avulla voidaan myös laskea tärkeysmitat. Vertailuissa käytettiin kolmea eri
tärkeysmittaa: Fussell-Veselyä, joka kuvaa osuutta sydänvauriotaajuudesta johon liittyy
laitteen vikaantuminen, riskinnousukerrointa, joka kuvaa suhteellista muutosta
sydänvauriotaajuudessa kun laite vikaantuu, sekä ehdollista sydänvaurio-
todennäköisyyttä, joka on sydänvaurion ehdollinen todennäköisyys kun laite aiheuttaa
alkutapahtuman.
Vertailut suoritettiin analysoimalla laitteiden tärkeysmittoja ja turvallisuusluokkia
hyödyntäen absoluuttisia arvoja, suhteellisia suuruusjärjestyksiä ja jakaumia. Aikaisempi
tieto siitä, että laitteiden turvallisuusluokat eivät ole täysin linjassa niiden
turvallisuusluokituksen kanssa, vahvistettiin. Yksittäinen matalan
turvallisuusluokituksen laite voi olla tärkeysmittojen mukaan merkittävämpi kuin
korkeamman turvallisuusluokituksen laite. Keskimäärin korkean turvallisuusluokan
laitteet ovat kuitenkin tärkeämpiä kuin alempien luokkien laitteet. Kullekin
turvallisuusluokalle määritettiin ylärajat tärkeysmittojen arvoille, jotka kertovat kuinka
suuria tärkeysmittojen arvoja voi kunkin luokan laitteilla olla. Ylärajoja voidaan
hyödyntää kun uuden laitteen luokitusta tai vanhan laitteen uudelleenluokitusta
harkitaan. Jos yksikin yläraja ylittyy, niin laite tulisi PRA-näkökulmasta luokitella
korkeampaan turvallisuusluokkaan.
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Abstract
In this thesis risk importance measures (RIMs) calculated for components in a nuclear
power plant with probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) are studied and their values are
compared to the safety classes given for the components based on primarily deterministic
guidelines in Finnish nuclear regulatory guides. There are four safety classes in use: SC1,
SC2, SC3 and EYT. Multiple requirements set for a component depend on the safety class.
In nuclear field the PRA models are used to model how the occurrence of smaller events,
can lead to core damage or containment failure. Two different types of events can be
identified on the highest resolution of a PRA model: basic events (BEs) and initiating
events (IEs). IEs are deviations from normal operation that require activation of safety
functions and BEs are used to model failures of that can cause the safety functions to fail.
PRA-software can then be used to solve sets of IEs and BEs whose simultaneous
occurrence can cause core damage and to calculate total core damage frequency (CDF).
The results can also be used to calculate RIMs. Three different RIMs were used in the
comparison for components: Fussell-Vesely that measures the share of CDF that involves
a failure of the component, Risk Achievement Worth that measures the relative increase
in CDF when the component fails and conditional core damage probability that is the
probability of core damage given that the component causes an IE.
The comparisons were carried out by analyzing the RIMs and safety classes of
components with absolute RIM values, relative rankings and distributions. A previously
known fact that RIM values of components are not completely in line with the safety
classification was confirmed. A component from a low safety class can be more significant
according to RIM values than a component from a higher safety class. However, on
average components from a high safety class are considered more significant than
components from lower safety classes. Upper limits were determined for safety classes
that show how high RIM values can components in each class currently have. The upper
limits can be used in assistance when classification of new components or reclassification
of existing components is being considered. If any of the upper limits of a safety class are
exceeded, then the component should be classified one class higher based on PRA.
Keywords probabilistic risk analysis, importance measures, safety classification,
nuclear power plant
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11 Introduction
1.1 Background
There were 450 nuclear reactors in operation in the world for generation of power in 2019
and the reactors contributed to around 10 % of the total electricity generation. Nuclear power
was also considered the second largest source of low carbon electricity after hydro power.
[1] There are four nuclear power reactors in operation in Finland. Two of the reactors are in
Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and the other two are in Olkiluoto NPP. In 2019, these
four reactor units contributed 25 % of the electricity consumption in Finland [2]. Even with
the increasing amount of renewable energy, nuclear power still has an important role in
reducing the climate change because of the low emissions of the power generation from
nuclear fuel.
The power generation in an NPP is based on a fission chain reaction in which the nucleus of
a uranium atom is split into two or more smaller nuclei and neutrons. The energy released
from this reaction is used to evaporate water into steam and then the steam is used to rotate
a turbine to generate electric energy. The nuclear fuel and the products of a fission reaction
are both radioactive and that causes a risk of the radioactive materials being released into the
environment. The radioactive materials are primarily stored in the reactor core, but core
damage can enable the radioactive materials to escape from the reactor core. After core
damage, the radioactive materials can be contained within the plant, but containment failure
would allow them to leave the plant.
Due to the risks, the frequencies of their severe consequences must be kept as low as
possible. There are many Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs) in an NPP that all
have a role in prevention of accidents and mitigating their consequences. The SSCs are safety
classified into multiple safety classes in order to categorize them according to their safety
significance. The purpose of the safety classification is to allocate resources to the SSCs
depending on their safety significance and to secure that the resources are consumed where
they are required the most. The safety class guides manufacturing, construction, quality
assurance and inspections and testing during operation of an SSC and therefore the costs
related to purchase, operation and maintenance for a highly classified SSC can be
significantly larger than for an SSC of a lower class. The current classification in Finland
and the requirements that a safety class sets for an SSC are both detailed in regulatory guides
on nuclear safety (YVL-guides) by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK).
Events in which reactor core is damaged and events in which radioactive materials leave the
plant after core damage are very rare. Therefore, estimating the frequencies of such events
is a complex process. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) is a methodology that can be applied
in NPPs and other complex technological entities to analyze and assess the risks within the
technological entities by analyzing sequences of events that can lead to the accident. These
sequences are also called accident sequences. The PRA models are used to model how
occurrence of smaller events can lead to core damage or containment failure. PRA can be
used to produce numerical estimates for risk metrics, including Core Damage Frequency
(CDF) and Large Release Frequency (LRF), and to identify the most important accident
sequences and SSCs. One method for identifying the most important SSCs is by calculating
Risk Importance Measures (RIMs) for the SSCs. The RIMs commonly measure how much
2the imperfection of an SSC currently affects the total CDF or LRF, or what are the
consequences of the failure of a component.
1.2 Objectives and scope
The safety classes that are primarily based on deterministic guidelines and the RIMs both
measure the significance of a component. It is required in guide YVL B.2 [3] that PRA is
used in assistance for the safety classification, but more detailed instructions for utilization
of PRA are not provided. It is important that the safety classes and RIMs are in line with
each other to secure that the most important SSCs have the correct safety class and to secure
that resources are not consumed on less important SSCs. Therefore the objectives in this
thesis are to study the RIMs, and to compare the RIM values and safety classes of
components to each other in order to obtain a justified understanding on the correspondence
between safety classes and RIM values and also an understanding about what kind of RIM
values can components in each safety class have.
The results from this thesis can be used in assistance of classification of new SSCs and re-
classification of current SSCs when modifications are made to the Loviisa NPP. The
comparison is limited to the SSCs included in Loviisa PRA model and the results are specific
to the Loviisa NPP due to the used data and the PRA model being specific to the plant. Due
to the plant being in Finland, this thesis focuses primarily on the Finnish legislation related
to safety classification.
Prior studies in Finland on risk-informed safety classification include [4] where a method
for risk-informed safety classification was suggested. A comparison between safety classes
of component failure events and their RIM values was included in [5] and in this comparison
it was concluded that the safety classes are not completely in line with the RIM values and
that there is much variance between the RIM values of components in a safety class. The
comparison was done on basic event (BE) level and based on the model and data from
Olkiluoto NPP operated by Teollisuuden Voima. However, [5] did not include suggestions
on the use of RIMs in classification. [5]
1.3 Structure
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The second chapter of this thesis introduces the
Loviisa NPP, basics about NPP power generation and safety systems, and relevant aspects
about nuclear safety, including safety classification. In the third chapter, the PRA
methodology and PRA model contents and quantification are explained. Then, in the fourth
chapter, the definitions and calculation of RIMs are explained, the effect of safety class on
RIM values is discussed and a foreign application of risk-informed safety categorization is
described. The safety classes of SSCs are compared to their RIM values in Chapter 5 and
the guiding values are suggested and tested against the current safety classes of components.
The sixth chapter concludes this thesis.
32 Nuclear power and nuclear safety
Because this thesis is focused on the Loviisa NPP, this chapter will first introduce the plant.
In the second section the power generation systems and other relevant systems of an NPP
housing a pressurized water reactor (PWR) are described with the focus on Loviisa NPP. In
the third section some aspects of nuclear safety systems are introduced, and the fourth section
introduces the safety classification in Finland and some special aspects of safety
classification in Loviisa NPP.
2.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
Loviisa NPP is located on the island of Hästholmen near the Finnish town Loviisa. The plant
consists of two units: Loviisa 1 (LO1) and Loviisa 2 (LO2). Construction of LO1 was started
in year 1970 and it was connected to grid in 1977. LO2 was constructed after LO1 and it
was connected to grid in 1980. Current operating licenses allow operation of LO1 until 2027
and operation of LO2 until 2030. [6]
The Loviisa NPP is a unique mixture of both Western and Eastern technology. The plant
was first planned to be purchased as a whole and the supplier was to be selected by
competitive bidding. Due to the political climate of the planning phase, the supplier of the
main components ended up being chosen to be the Soviet Atomenergoexport. The main
components included reactor, turbine and generator. The safety systems were supplied by
Western companies for them to comply with the western standards. [7]
Both of the reactors are Soviet-made VVER-440 type (Rus. Водо-водяной энергетический
реактор, water-water energetic reactor) PWRs [7]. The reactors both operate at nominal
thermal powers of 1500 MW and the net electrical capacities of LO1 and LO2 in 2019 were
both 507 MW, resulting in a total 0,338 electrical efficiency of the plant and contribution of
11% of Finland’s total electricity production. Total load factor is defined as the ratio between
total electricity generation and maximum electrical energy output at constant nominal power
and the value for this factor was 93,0% for LO1 in 2019. [8]
2.2 Systems and components in a PWR plant
There are multiple SSCs in a PWR plant. A system is defined in [9] as a functional or
structural collection of components assembled to perform a function. Components are
equipment, such as pumps, valves, relays or elements of a larger array. Structures are
elements, or collections of elements that provide support or enclosure, including buildings,
tanks, basins, dikes and stacks. [9] The systems in an NPP can be divided into four groups:
process systems, ventilation and heating systems, electrical systems and automation systems.
The power generation principle and systems are introduced first, then the safety systems and
finally the automation and electrical systems are introduced.
2.2.1 Power generation
The working principle of an NPP is very similar to the one of a conventional power plant.
The main difference is the fuel and the reaction with which the thermal energy is released
from the fuel. Whereas conventional power plants utilize combustion reaction to release the
energy from chemical bonds between atoms, NPPs utilize fission reaction to release the
energy from bonds within an atom nucleus. The steam-water cycle of an NPP is illustrated
in Figure 1. Next, an overview of the power generation principle of a PWR plant is provided.
4Figure 1 Power generation principle of an NPP. Translated from [7]
Fission reaction and nuclear reactor
The fission reaction is a reaction in which a heavy atom nucleus splits into two smaller
nuclei, called fission products, and sub-atomic particles, including neutrons. Energy released
in this reaction is released as mostly kinetic energy of the products and is then converted into
heat in the interactions between the high velocity products and their surroundings. A VVER-
440 type PWR uses uranium oxide as its fuel and the isotope of Uranium is U-235. [10] The
fuel is compressed into small ceramic pellets whose diameter is around 1 cm. The pellets are
stacked into fuel rods and the rods are assembled into hexagonal fuel stacks. The stacks are
surrounded with flow paths for coolant water. [7]
When a U-235 nucleus is bombarded with neutrons, one neutron needs to be absorbed by
the nucleus and this initiates the fission reaction. The neutrons released in this reaction are
used to initiate the following fission reactions of the other U-235 nuclei and this is called
fission chain reaction. Neutrons must be first slowed down in order for them to be able to be
absorbed by the other U-235 nuclei. This is done with a moderator, which in a PWR reactor
is light water that also serves as reactor coolant to transfer heat out of the reactor. [10]
Multiple neutrons are released in one fission reaction and on average only one of those
neutrons should initiate a fission reaction for the power output to remain constant. If the
average is less than one, the fission chain reaction will eventually end, and the reaction is
called subcritical. If the average is more than one, the reaction is called supercritical and the
power output keeps increasing. [7]
5Reactivity is controlled with control rods and boron concentration of coolant water. Boron
is an effective absorbent of neutrons released in the fission reaction. Control rods are located
between the fuel bundles and they are moved vertically in the reactor in order to control the
reactivity. They are held up with electromagnets and if the current is cut from the magnets,
the rods will drop into the reactor to shut it down. [7] The bundles, along with control rods
and protective elements form a reactor core. The reactor core is located within a reactor
pressure vessel. [11]
Primary coolant circuit
There are two closed coolant circuits in PWR plants: primary and secondary. The primary
circuit is used to transfer heat from the reactor to the secondary circuit which is like the
water-steam circuit of a conventional power plant. Water in the primary circuit is pressurized
to a pressure of 123 bar in order to prevent evaporation and the pressure level is maintained
with a pressurizer which contains a mixture of steam and water. To increase the pressure,
the mixture is heated with an electric heater to increase the amount of steam and to decrease
the pressure, the steam is condensed with water sprays. Primary circuit water is heated in the
reactor flow channels within the reactor by the fission reaction. Primary circuit then brings
the heated water into evaporators where the heat is transferred into the water of the secondary
circuit. The cooled primary circuit water then flows back into the reactor and is heated again.
Water flow is maintained with main circulation pumps that pump the water from evaporator
into flow channels within the reactor’s flow channels. [7] The reactor pressure vessel,
pressurizer and the main circuits form the reactor coolant system [11].
Secondary coolant circuit
Secondary circuit water from a feedwater tank is first heated in a preheater with steam from
turbine and then fed into the evaporator with feedwater pumps. Water of the secondary
circuit is evaporated in the evaporator due to the lower pressure of the secondary circuit.
After the evaporator the steam is used to rotate a high-pressure turbine, then it is reheated
and mechanically dried and afterwards used to rotate a low pressure turbine. The turbine is
connected to a generator shaft whose rotation is used to convert mechanical energy into
electrical energy in two generators. After passing through the low-pressure turbine, the
steam-water mixture is condensed in a condenser. The heat from the steam-water mixture is
transferred to seawater flowing in the seawater circuit. The sea water functions as the
ultimate heat sink of the plant where the residual heat is released. [11]
2.2.2 Safety functions and systems
The radioactive materials that are the source of most hazards in an NPP are located for the
most part within the fuel pellets and the active materials consist of the fuel and the fission
products. The fission products, due to their activity, pose a hazard called decay heat that is
the product of the decay of the fission products and it is released even after the fission chain
reaction has been stopped. Damage to the reactor can be caused by multiple different kinds
of accident sequences, but generally the core is damaged due to a criticality accident, in
which the reactor becomes supercritical for an increased amount of the time, or due to a loss
of coolant accident (LOCA). Both accidents result in the reactor temperature increasing and
possibly damaging it. [12] Definition given for core damage in [13] is:
“uncovery and heatup of the reactor core to the point at which prolonged oxidation and
severe fuel damage is anticipated representing the onset of gap release of radionuclides”
6After core damage the active materials can be contained within the plant, but a containment
failure may allow a large release to escape the plant. In Finland, a large release is defined as
a release of more than 100 TBq of Caesium-137 isotope [14].  LRF is then the mean
frequency of a such release. A large early release frequency is defined as the mean frequency
of a release of airborne fission products from the containment to the environment before
effective implementation of off-site emergency response [13].
Safety functions are utilized in prevention of core damage or containment failure from
occurring. They are specific purposes or objectives that must be achieved in order to control
the energy sources and radiation hazards in the plant. Systems that are designed for carrying
out safety functions are called safety systems. [15] The safety systems of Loviisa NPP are
illustrated in Figure 2. In Loviisa NPP the systems were defined before the safety functions
were defined. When the plant was being planned, the practices and standards of the time did
not include the use of safety functions in assistance of the planning of the plant. [16]
Therefore the relationship between specific functions and systems are not that direct in the
plant.
Figure 2 Safety systems in Loviisa NPP. The system numbers are as follows: 1: steel containment, 2:
external containment cooling, 3: air filters, 4: additional emergency feed water pumping station, 5:
uranium core, 6: low-pressure safety injection pumps, 7: high-pressure safety injection pumps, 8
emergency feed water pumps, 9: power supply from hydropower station, 10: reserve power diesel
generators, 11: sprinklers, 12: hydrogen release and recombiners, 13: ice condensers, 14: safety hydro
accumulators. Figure from [17]
Identification of safety functions and the systems that carry out the functions is required in
Finnish regulation on the safety of a nuclear power plant Y/1/2018 [18]. These functions can
be used either for preventing accidents or mitigating their consequences. Safety functions
7also have a role in safety classification, and they are used in construction of PRA models.
There are three main safety functions identified by International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in [19]:
1. Control of reactivity
2. Removal of heat from the nuclear reactor and from the fuel store
3. Confinement of radioactive material, shielding against radiation and control of
planned radioactive releases, as well as limitation of accidental radioactive releases
The full list of safety functions is plant specific and more detailed than the list of the main
safety functions. In the final safety assessment report (FSAR) of Loviisa NPP [16], these
main safety functions along with supporting functions and control of severe accidents are
also referred to as safety objectives. The safety objectives are achieved through safety
measures and the safety measures are executed with safety functions. [16]
2.2.3 Electrical and automation systems
The electrical systems of Loviisa NPP have three general objectives as described in [20]:
1. Generation of electrical energy
2. Providing electricity to electrical actuators and to automation systems during
operation of the plant
3. Providing safety systems with electricity during incidents and accidents
The plant has two connections to the 400 kV grid, one is to the village of Koria and the other
is to the village of Anttila. The generators supply the generated electricity through main
transformers and switchgear into the grid. The generators, along with the 400 kV
connections, are used to supply the SSCs within the plant with electricity during normal
operation. During outages, the plant is supplied by a connection to 110 kV grid. The 110 kV
connection can be replaced with either a diesel generator, or with a connection to
Ahvenkoski hydro power plant. [20]
Both units are also equipped with additional four diesel generators each, two for each
redundancy. These generators are used to supply SSCs important to safety with electricity
in case the connections to grid are lost. The generators are started up with pressurized air
that is stored in pressurized air tanks. Components whose operation cannot withstand the
delay in diesel generator startup are supplied with electricity from battery sets. The diesel
generators require multiple supporting systems for operation that include startup system,
cooling system and fuel systems. [20] While the diesel generators itself are considered
electrical systems in this thesis, the supporting systems are considered process systems.
Automation systems are used to control both short term and long-term safety functions in
the plant. Short term functions include functions related to normal process control,
preventive protection and reactor protection. The long-term functions are related to accident
conditions, and the functions are initiated manually. [21] Automation components modelled
in the Loviisa PRA model include measurements, automation signals, and automation
cabinets and hubs.
82.2.4 Operating locations
The SSCs can be identified by their operating locations (OLs). The OL of a pump does not
directly refer to an exact pump, but rather a physical or logical location within a process
where the pump operates at. The pump can be moved to storage while another pump is placed
in the OL. The pumps also have separate IDs that refer to that exact pump, but the OL is
used, for example, in PI-diagrams, PRA models and the OLs are the entities that are safety
classified, not the specific pumps. In Loviisa NPP the identification of OLs is based on
German AKZ-system that is no longer developed. [22] Figure 3 displays the structure of the
KZ-ID of an OL. In this system the OLs form a hierarchy, in which on the top level is the
plant unit. The plant unit consists of systems, and the systems consist of subsystems that in
turn consist of structures and components. This hierarchy can also be seen in the structure of
the KZ-ID as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Structure of a KZ-ID used in Loviisa NPP. Translated from [22]
2.3 Nuclear safety
Next some selected aspects about nuclear safety are introduced. These include basic
principles applied in Finnish legislation related to nuclear safety, classification of different
types of accidents and incidents, and some of the main design principles applied in the safety
design of NPPs.
2.3.1 Principles in Finnish legislation
A main principle of Finnish nuclear legislation is that nuclear power, considering all of its
impacts, should be beneficial to the society. Utilization of nuclear energy should be safe and
not cause damage to people, environment or property. [7] The risks related to nuclear power
can always be decreased, but the cost of decreasing the risks increases as the risks are
decreased. At some point, the generation from nuclear energy is not beneficial anymore due
to the costs of the production. Application of a SAHARA (Safety As High As Reasonably
Achievable) principle is required in the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act 990/1987 [23]. This
principle requires that all measures should be applied if they can be considered reasonable
based on operational experience, safety analyses and development of science and technology
[23].
Requirements are set for maximum CDF and LRF values for new plants by STUK in guide
YVL A.7 [24]. The upper limit for CDF is defined at 10−5 1
𝑎
, and the limit for LRF is defined
at 5 × 10−7 1
𝑎
. [24] In addition to the SAHARA-principle, application of ALARA (As Low
9As Reasonably Achievable) principle is required in YVL B.1 [15]. This principle is applied
for personnel working in NPPs whose exposure to radioactive materials cannot be removed
completely. According to the principle, the plants should be designed so that the personnel’s
exposure is kept minimal. [15]
2.3.2 Classes of accidents and incidents
Potential accidents and incidents in NPPs are classified depending on the estimated
frequency of their occurrence and the radiological release. The classes of accidents for
Finnish legislation are described in [14] and upper limits for their radioactive releases are
provided. These classes and limitations are primarily used for deterministic analyses and for
design requirements of a plant but are also relevant for the deterministic safety classification.
An anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) is a deviation from normal operation that can
be expected to occur one or more times during one hundred operating years. [14] AOOs can
be caused by a malfunction of a single component for example. AOOs can be coped with by
the systems of a plant while having the potential to damage the reactor if other malfunctions
are included. [12]
Postulated accidents (PA) are expected to occur less often than once in a hundred years and
the plant is expected to withstand them without the fuel being damaged even if individual
safety significant components are unavailable due to maintenances or failures. PAs are
divided into two classes based on their expected frequency. Class 1 PAs are expected to
occur less often than once in a hundred years, but at least once in 1000 operating years. Class
2 PAs are expected to occur less often than once in 1000 operating years. [14]
Design extension conditions (DEC) are an extension to PAs. These accidents are not
included in the PAs. DEC refers to three different combinations of different kinds of
accidents and failures: [14]
a) accident caused by an AOO or a class 1 PA is accompanied with a common cause
failure
b) accident caused by a combination of failures that is identified as significant with PRA
c) accident caused by a rare external event that the plant is expected to withstand
without severe fuel damage
A severe accident is an accident in which a significant share of the reactor fuel, or fuel in
reactor pool or fuel storage, loses its original structure. Or in other words, core damage
occurs. Severe accidents shall not require large precautionary measures of the population, or
long-term limitations to land and water areas. [14]
Each class has been set an objective plant state to which the plant should be able to be
brought after an accident. These plant states are defined in [18]. There is a controlled state
and a safe state. The plant is first brought to controlled state in which the reactor is shut down
and decay heat removal is secured. In a safe state the reactor is shut down, depressurized and
decay heat removal is secured. For severe accidents, the definitions for controlled and safe
state differ a little from other accidents. In controlled state after a severe accident the heat
removal from remains of reactor core can be secured, the temperature is constant or
decreasing, the remains are in a form that will not become supercritical again and
considerable amounts of fission products are not released. In a safe state after a severe
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accident the requirements for controlled state are fulfilled and pressure within the
confinement building is low enough that amount of leakage is low even if the building has
been ruptured. [18]
2.3.3 Design principles
There are multiple requirements and principles related to plant design that are introduced
next. These principles have significant impacts on safety as they have an effect on how
reliably the systems function. The principles include defence-in-depth, diversity, redundancy
and separation -principles.
Defence-in-depth
Defence-in-depth is a fundamental principle applied in the design of NPPs. Application of
defence-in-depth is required by IAEA in [25] and in Finnish legislation [23]. Defence-in-
depth should be applied in plant design and operation, in all plant states and in all plant
operating modes. The main idea of this concept is to provide multiple levels of protection
instead of attempting to make one perfect level of protection. If one level would fail, the next
one would be available. When this is properly applied, no single human or component failure
or external event will lead to harmful consequences. [12] Five levels of defence-in-depth
that the plants should be designed to include are identified by IAEA in [18]:
1) Prevention of deviations from normal operation and failures of items important to
safety
2) Detection and control of deviations from normal operation in order to prevent AOOs
from developing into accident conditions
3) Control of accident conditions resulting from an AOO to prevent them from
damaging the reactor core and causing a severe accident
4) Mitigating the consequences of a severe accident by preventing the radioactive
release from leaving the plant site
5) Mitigating the radiological consequences of radioactive releases that may result from
severe accidents. This includes preparation of on-site and off-site emergency
responses for the potential severe accidents
Diversity
Diversity-principle is applied in safety systems to reduce the probability of failure of a whole
safety function due to failures that affect multiple components. This is achieved by installing
multiple systems or components whose operating principles are different from each other. A
common example of this is the control of reactivity. The controlling can be done either with
the control rods or by adding boron to coolant water. Diversity-principle is applied also to
the control and automation systems in addition to process-systems. Many automation
systems function on the basis of measurements and thus it is important to have measurements
of different properties, like temperature and pressure. The diversity principle can also be
applied on smaller scale by for example purchasing valves from different manufacturers. [7]
Redundancy
Safety systems in NPPs are often divided into multiple redundancies, meaning that there are
multiples of parallel and similar SSCs functioning independently of each other. The
redundancies are used to reduce the probability that a safety function is unavailable due to
individual failures of a components or due to scheduled maintenances. Redundancy
requirements for systems and subsystems are presented as fault criterion requirements.
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Examples of this include (N+2), (N+1) and (N+0) criteria where N tells the necessary
minimum amount of functioning components to achieve the safety function and the number
tells how many additional redundant components need to be installed. (N+2) principle means
that a safety function must be able to be achieved even if two pumps are out of use due to
maintenance or a failure. [7]
Separation
The objective of separation of systems and components is to secure their functionality even
in the case a hazard threatens multiple components in a specific location in the plant. For
example, these hazards can be a flood or a fire. Separation principle is applied as both
physical and functional separation. Physical separation means that the redundant safety
systems should be separated in different locations so that the hazard will not prevent both of
them from working. Different parts of the power plant process are also located in different
buildings. Functional separation means that parallel systems are prevented from interfering
with each other. [7]
2.4 Safety Classification
In this section the safety classification legislation and deterministic requirements for safety
classification are introduced first. Then some special properties of the classification in
Loviisa NPP are introduced. The requirements that a safety class sets are described later in
Section 4.4 when their impact on RIM values are discussed.
2.4.1 Safety classification in Finland
It is required in [18] that the SSCs of a Finnish NPP are safety classified according to their
safety significance. The safety class of an SSC guides the design, manufacture, installation,
operation, inspections and quality assurance of the SSC. [18] The purpose of this is to ensure
that the proportion of the listed actions is in line with the safety significance of the SSC. The
classification of SSCs in Finland is instructed in more detail in regulatory guide YVL B.2.
[3] The latest version of this guide was released in 2019 and the version before that was
released in 2013.
The SSCs in an NPP are classified into four classes: 1, 2, 3 and EYT (Finn. Ei Ydinteknisesti
Turvallisuusluokiteltu, non-safety classified). The most important SSCs are classified in
Safety Class 1 (SC1), while least important components belong to class EYT. There is also
a class EYT/STUK for some EYT systems considered important. [3] Special quality
requirements are not set by EYT/STUK for the systems, but the class sets additional
requirements on information that is required to be delivered to STUK about those systems.
The components in EYT/STUK systems generally belong to class EYT. [26] There was also
a Safety Class 4 (SC4) that was removed in the 2013 update, while EYT/STUK was added.
The purpose of SC4 was to include less important SSCs from higher classes, but it was
noticed that more SSCs were moved from class EYT to SC4 than from Safety class 3 (SC3)
to SC4. [27]
The classification of SSCs should be based primarily on deterministic methods
supplemented by PRA and expert judgement [3]. It is stated in YVL A.7 [24] that PRA
should be used during planning phase of a plant to confirm that the safety classes of SSCs
are in line with their safety significance. A PRA application should be delivered to STUK
with safety classification documentation. During operation phase PRA should be used
similarly when there are significant changes made to the plant or PRA model. [24] Neither
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of the guides give direct instructions on how PRA should be used in safety classification and
there are only direct instructions for deterministic classification in the guide [3]. IAEA also
suggests the use of PRA to verify the deterministic safety classification and if there are
differences between SSC importance according to PRA and the safety class, then further
assessment should be carried out in order to understand the reasons for the deviations [19].
An NPP licensee can diverge from the deterministic requirements stated in YVL B.2 if they
can reasonably show that the required safety level is achieved even with another safety class.
The approved safety classification of existing components can also be changed to either
increase or decrease the safety classification. The application needs to be approved by STUK
in both cases. [28]
There are two different safety classes that a component can have: functional safety class and
structural safety class. Safety functions and systems can only have the functional safety class
and structures can only have the structural safety class. The functional safety class is based
on safety functions. The safety functions are classified first based on their significance in
prevention of accidents. The functional safety class of a system is then based on the
significance of the system in the execution of safety functions. Components that are
important for the execution of the safety function of a system generally belong to the same
functional safety class as the system. Some components within the system can also belong
to higher or lower safety classes. Individual components that are connected to systems of
higher safety class can belong to the higher safety class, while components that are less
important for the safety functions can belong to a lower safety class. Structural safety class
of structures and components is based on the requirements that they have as a barrier against
spread of radioactive materials. [3] This includes the requirements in prevention of large
pipe leakages, for example [26]. When a component has two different safety classes, the
higher one should be used for determining the requirements [3].
The safety classification has its basis in the defence-in-depth principle, but there are no direct
connections between safety class and defence-in-depth. Instead, SSCs from multiple
different safety classes can be used on the same level of defence-in-depth. [26] The division
of safety classes among the defence-in-depth levels is illustrated in Figure 4. Next the
deterministic directions for each class are introduced.
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Figure 4 Safety classes and defence in depth. [26]
Safety Class 1
Selected parts of the reactor coolant circuit should be classified as SC1. SC1 is only a
structural safety class and it is not used on system-level. On component and structure level
this class should include the structures and components whose failure could cause an
accident impacting integrity of the reactor and requiring activation of safety measures. This
includes nuclear fuel, reactor pressure vessel and the parts of primary circuit whose rupture
could result in a primary circuit leak that cannot be replaced with systems related to normal
plant operation. [3]
Safety Class 2
Systems and their obligatory support systems should be classified to Safety Slass 2 (SC2) if
they are required for executing safety functions related to bringing the plant to controlled
state after a PA or if they are required for keeping the plant in the controlled state. Systems
that are required for confinement of radioactive materials inside the confinement building
after a PA should also be classified to SC2. [3]
Based on the structural requirements, structures and components that should be classified to
SC2 include less important parts of the primary circuit and structures and components
outside the primary circuit. From the primary circuit SC2 includes pipes and components
whose damage can be compensated for with systems related to normal operation, and
components that can be isolated from the reactor coolant system with two sequential valves
whose closing time is short enough to ensure safe shut down and cooling of reactor. Outside
the primary circuit SC2 includes structures and components whose integrity is required for
residual heat removal or for confinement after a failure of a SC1 component or after a pipe
rupture. In addition, structures and components whose failure endangers the integrity of a
SC1 barrier or the nuclear fuel, and whose failure causes a danger of an uncontrollable chain
reactor, should be classified to SC2. [3]
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According to the asset management system LOMAX [29] that is used in Loviisa NPP, this
class includes OLs from a wide range of system groups. These groups include electrical
distribution boxes and switchgears, control boards and consoles, fuel systems, secondary
circuit, reactor support systems, sea-water circuit, reactor containment, and nuclear steam
supply system. [29]
Safety Class 3
The list of conditions based on which systems should be classified to SC3 is much longer
than for the higher safety classes. In summary, the list includes systems that are safety-
related functionally or structurally, but that are not classified to SC1 or SC2. Based on
structural requirements SC3 includes structures  that secure SC2 system availability and
physical separation, structures and components that secure SC3 safety functions and
structures and components related to confinement and handling of radioactive materials, but
do not belong to SC1 or SC2 and their failure can lead to significant spread of radioactive
materials within the plant or to its surroundings. [3]
Safety Class EYT and EYT/STUK
If the system is not required to be classified into classes 1, 2 or 3, it should be classified into
the class EYT (not safety classified). However, the following systems belonging to class
EYT should be classified to class EYT/STUK instead: [3]
1. Systems that protect systems in higher safety classes from internal or external events,
such as fire extinguishing equipment
2. Systems that are used for monitoring radiation, surface contamination or
radioactivity of the plant, but do not belong to SC3
3. Systems that are needed for bringing the plant back to controlled state and from
controlled state to safe state after a severe reactor accident
2.4.2 Safety classification in Loviisa NPP
In Loviisa NPP the SSCs are classified according to YVL B.2 but there are some special
aspects about the classification. While it is described in YVL B.2 that a single component
can have up to two safety classes, the SSCs in Loviisa NPP can have up to four different
safety classes. A single valve can have a functional safety class based on the safety function,
and three other safety classes based on three technical fields: mechanical, electrical and
automation. The structural safety class is included in the mechanical safety class. Structures
in Loviisa NPP are generally not safety classified. The plant was built when the YVL-guides
did not require classification of the structures and adopting new YVL-guide requirements
has not yet required the classification of the structures. [30]
For example, a motor operated valve consists of mechanical parts and the actuator that is
operated electrically and controlled with automation systems. A valve can then be classified
to SC3 based on its mechanical parts, but to SC2 based on the electrical parts. The
mechanical class can also be higher than the other classes due to there being structural
requirements for the structure of the piping section, but the valve itself is not required for
important safety functions. The electrical safety class of a consumer of electricity covers the
component and the whole electricity supply chain [20].
There are no exact numbers for the share of components categorized to each class in the
power plant, but some approximate numbers can be obtained from LOMAX [29]. Valves
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and their mechanical safety classes are used as an example to provide some insight on how
the components are spread into different safety classes. Data from [29] was used to calculate
the total number of valves and the total number of valves that are classified to each safety
class according to YVL B.2 and then shares were calculated. The results are in Table 1
below:
Table 1 Safety classes and the share of total components that belong to the class. Data from [29]
Safety
class
Share of total
valves
1 0,64 %
2 5,26 %
3 15,86 %
EYT 78,25 %
.
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3 Probabilistic Risk Analysis
In this chapter the PRA methodology is introduced with focus on nuclear PRA. The first
section provides some background information related to PRA, also including definition of
risk and historical overview of PRA. The second section shows how the PRA is divided into
different levels. The third section introduces the concepts of component reliability and
unreliability that are used in estimation of failure probability of a component. Then the
contents of a PRA model and how the model is quantified are explained. Some special
aspects of the Loviisa PRA model and results of the model are presented. In Loviisa NPP,
the software used for creating and solving the PRA models is called RiskSpectrum and the
data used in this thesis is calculated with version RiskSpectrum PSA 1.3.2 of the software.
This and the following chapter therefore focus on PRA with basis of how RiskSpectrum
functions.
3.1 Background
There are multiple definitions used for risk, but in this thesis the terminology related to risk
and risk analysis is adopted from [31] where risk is defined as a set of scenarios each of
which has a probability and a consequence. Risk analysis focuses on the hazards related to
these scenarios and the following questions are considered [31]:
1. What can happen?
2. What is the probability of it happening?
3. What are the consequences if it happens?
PRA is a structured methodology used for identifying and analyzing risks in complex
technological entities, such as NPPs, and for producing numerical estimates for risk metrics.
In this thesis the term ‘Probabilistic Risk Analysis’ is used. Other terms used to refer to PRA
include ‘Probabilistic Risk Assessment’ and ‘Probabilistic Safety Analysis/Assessment’.
PRA is used to examine frequencies and consequences of accidents in NPPs by analyzing
accident sequences and operation of the safety systems. [31] An accident sequence is defined
as a series of events that begins from an initiating event (IE) that challenges safety functions
and can potentially lead to core damage and afterwards to release of radioactive materials
from the plant [13].
In Finland it is required in [14] that a PRA analysis is submitted to STUK when applying for
a construction license of a plant and when applying for an operating license [14]. STUK
defines more specific requirements for PRA models and their use in [24]. The main
objectives for PRA in Loviisa NPP are according to [32]:
1. Estimation of CDF and LRF
2. Identification of accident sequences, systems, components and functions that are
most important with respect to risk
3. Identification of possible requirements for plant modifications
4. Estimation of probability for containment bypass in core damage events
5. Education of operation and maintenance personnel about risk significant aspects,
prevention of them and the mitigation of their consequences
The PRA methods for NPPs were first used in USA in Reactor Safety Study led by Norman
Carl Rasmussen in the 1970s. The study was started in 1972 and the report Reactor Safety
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Study WASH-1400 [33] was published in 1975. The objectives of the study were to evaluate
the consequences of a serious accident in a large modern light water reactor and the
probability of their occurrence and to compare the risks associated with nuclear power to
other risks Americans were subject to. The staff of Reactor Safety Study consisted of about
40 scientists and engineers and cost 4 million USD in currency of the 1970s. The team
managed to estimate that the frequency of core melt for a PWR was about 6E-5 per reactor
year and for boiling water reactors about 3E-5 per reactor year. [34] Results of the
comparison between nuclear accidents and other types of accidents are shown in Figure 5.
Prior to the Reactor Safety Study fault-tree methods were utilized in the American aerospace
sector in the 1960s. The Boeing Company with Bell Laboratories pioneered the use of fault
tree analysis in design of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile launch system for
the U.S. Air Force. In 1966 the fault tree analysis was used in design of the Boeing-747
commercial jet and also NASA started using the fault tree methods in 1967 following the
fire on Apollo-1. However, prior to WASH-1400, event tree methods were not yet utilized.
[34]
Figure 5 Results of WASH-1400. Risk of 100 operating NPPs is compared to accidents caused by man
on the left and to natural accidents on the right. [33]
3.2 Levels of PRA
The three questions considered in risk analysis are answered to on three different levels of
PRA. The three different levels of PRA were identified in PRA Procedures Guide [35]. The
same levels of PRA are also identified in the Finnish legislation [24]. The three levels are
called systems analysis, containment analysis and consequence analysis [35]. In addition to
the different levels, PRA models are further divided based on operating modes.
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Level 1: Systems analysis
Systems analysis constitutes a major partition of the PRA. The analysis on this level focuses
on accident sequences that can lead to core damage. Objective is to identify all such accident
sequences, their basic causes and the frequencies of their occurrence. The frequencies of
accident sequences can then be used to determine the total CDF for the unit or plant.
Identifying the sequences is achieved by first identifying all the events that challenge plant
operation. Then the various responses, effects of external conditions and human errors are
identified and analyzed. Results of level 1 PRA do not contain any notion on the
consequences of the core damage. [35]
Level 2: Containment analysis
Containment analysis focuses on radioactive releases from the containment when core
damage has occurred. Pathways and transportation of radionuclides from the damaged core
into the environment of the reactor containment building are analyzed. A starting point for
level 2 analysis is provided by level 1 results, including the CDF, accident sequences that
lead to CDF and their frequencies. Level 2 analysis then focuses on the barriers and systems
used for preventing the radioactive materials from leaving the containment building. The
results include probability, time and mode of containment failure, and number of
radionuclides released to the environment for each accident sequence. These results provide
insight on the radiological consequences of each type of core damage and LRF can be
calculated based on the results. [35]
Level 3: Consequence analysis
In consequence analysis the containment is assumed to have failed and the analysis on this
level then focuses on the consequences of the radioactive releases. The consequences include
health effects and impacts on environment and property. Health effects include both short-
term injuries and long-term cancers. Environmental effects include contamination of the land
area surrounding the plant. Consequences are typically expressed as early fatalities, latent
cancer fatalities and property damage. Consequences analysis begins with estimating the
spread of radioactive materials based on location of the release from the plant, surrounding
terrain and weather conditions. This information, along with local population density
information, can be used to estimate how many persons are exposed to the radioactive
release. [35] According to [24] level 3 PRA is not necessary to be submitted to STUK in
Finland and only level 1 and 2 PRAs are required.
Operating modes
NPPs operate in multiple different operational modes along the year, mainly due to
scheduled annual outages. For the most part of the year, the plants operate at their nominal
power. Operating mode influences operation of multiple systems at a specific time. Due to
the operational differences, and differences in reactor criticality and other conditions, the
PRA models need to be different for each operating mode. As a result, the analysis within
level 1 and 2 PRA is further divided into analysis of each operating mode. The total CDF
and LRF are both calculated as a sum of the CDF and LRF of each operating mode. There
are six operating modes defined for Loviisa NPP and they are [36]:
1. Refueling shutdown
2. Cold shutdown
3. Hot shutdown
4. Hot standby
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5. Startup
6. Power operation
The plant is taken through these modes in this order when it is started from shutdown, and
in opposite order when it is being shut down. The operating modes are defined based on
physical parameters (primary circuit temperature, boron concentration, reactor power),
component states (control rod position, reactor cover position) and governmental regulations
[36]. For the Loviisa PRA model the six modes are further divided into total of 18 different
operating modes based on which components or subsystems are under maintenance and
based on requirements set for safety systems [37]. While power operation covers about
90 % of a calendar year, the accident sequences occurring during power operation contribute
to under 50 % of the total CDF for LO1.
3.3 Component reliability and availability
Component reliability and availability are essential subjects in PRA. Components can be
either functioning or failed at a given time. The state of the component changes by time. All
components will fail eventually and for non-repairable components this failed state is
permanent. A repairable component is in the failed state for the duration from failure
detection to failure repair. Change from functioning state to a failed state is called a failure
and change from failed state to functioning is called a repair. In reliability engineering, the
state of component after a repair is often considered “as good as new”. [38]  In this thesis a
component being in functional state or available means that the component can perform a
specified task. For example, a valve can close. This does not include any notation whether
the valve is able to open. Component state, reliability and availability are considered to be
specific to one failure mode of a component.
Reliability of a component is defined as probability that a component stays functional for a
specified period of time 𝑡. Unreliability is the opposite of this. Unreliability measures the
probability that a component has failed one or more times during the specified period of time
𝑡. Reliability and unreliability are used when non-repairable components are considered.
Availability and unavailability are used for repairable components. Availability is defined
as the probability that a component is functioning at a point in time 𝑡, given that the
component was functioning at 𝑡 = 0. Unavailability of a component 𝑈𝑖(𝑡) is the probability
that the component is in failed state at a point in time 𝑡, given that the component was
functioning at 𝑡 = 0. [38]
Four classes of unavailability are identified for components in the PRA model for Loviisa
NPP [39]:
- K: Unavailability due to critical failures that cause the component to be in failed state
immediately after failure.
- L: Unavailability due to latent failures that do not cause the component to be in failed
state immediately after failure, but the repair of the failure makes the component
unavailable. Failure needs to be fixed before it evolves into a critical failure.
- M: Unavailability caused by scheduled maintenances, periodic tests or other
scheduled non-failure related activities that cause the component to be unavailable
- H: Unavailability due to human errors during scheduled maintenances, periodic tests
or calibrations
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Only unavailability of class K and L are considered relevant when considering safety
classification in this thesis because only they are related to component failures. Calculation
of unavailability for failures depends on how a component is operated and three different
classes are identified for this purpose. Class A components are in standby and are not
operated unless they are required. Failures of standby components are noticed only when the
component is used either in periodic tests or on demand. Class B components are in
continuous operation and their failures are detected immediately. Class C components are in
alternating operation. [39] An example of alternating operation is two pumps out of which
one is in standby for four weeks while the other one is operating for those four weeks. The
pumps switch from operating to standby and vice versa every four weeks.
Unavailability is calculated as a function of failure rate 𝜆𝑖 and the average time the
component is unavailable after each failure. This time includes time from failure detection
to component restoration 𝜏𝑖 and the time the component is in failed state prior to detection.
The latter is usually calculated based on time interval between periodic test runs 𝑇𝑖. The
failure data can be obtained as generic data or plant data. Generic data is data collected from
literature sources that use data from multiple power plants. Issues with generic data are that
the components are in different plants under different conditions and different maintenance
programs and the manufacturers can also be different. When the databases for generic data
are collected, the detection methods of failures are not specified. Plant data is plant specific
data and therefore more accurate for the plant and components that are being analyzed. There
can be too little operational experience for some components, or the failures are so rare that
plant data cannot be used, and generic data needs to be used instead. [39] Next, the
calculation of unavailability is explained as it is calculated for components in the Loviisa
PRA model [39].
Unavailability for standby components is calculated based on generic data as
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖 ൬𝜏 + 𝑇𝑜 + 𝑇𝑖2൰ (1)
where 𝑇𝑜 is time for which the component is required to function after an IE. Value for this
is usually 24 hours. 𝑇𝑖
2
 is a half of the time interval between test runs. Failures of standby
components are not detected immediately. The unknown amount of time between failure and
failure detection would average to 𝑇𝑖
2
 in an infinitely large sample. For components in
alternating operation the time interval between operating periods is used. For components in
constant operation 𝑇𝑖 = 0 and unavailability can be calculated as
𝑈𝑖 = 𝜆𝑖൫𝜏𝑖 + 𝑇𝑜,𝑖൯ (2)
Use of equation (2) assumes that all failures are detected in the periodic tests. When plant
data is used instead, the unavailability is divided into three parts depending on how the
failures are detected:
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝑆 + 𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝑀 + 𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝐷 (3)
where 𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝑆 is unavailability due to failures detected in a periodic test or scheduled
maintenance, 𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝑀  is unavailability due to failures detected immediately and 𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝐷  is
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unavailability due to failures detected on demand. The method of failure detection affects
how much of the interval between periodic tests needs to be taken into account for
calculating the unavailability.
The unavailability due to failures detected in periodic tests is
𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝑆 = 1 − 1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝐾𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑆𝜆𝐾𝑆𝑇𝐾𝑆 × 𝜇𝐾𝑆𝜆𝐾𝑆 + 𝜇𝐾𝑆 (4)
Where 𝜇 is restoration rate 𝜇 = 1
𝜏
. Unavailability due to failures detected by other methods
are calculated similarly, but 𝑇𝐾𝑀 = 0 and 𝑇𝐾𝐷 = 0,5 𝑇𝐾𝑆. For immediately detected failures
then applies
𝑈𝑖,𝐾𝑀 = 𝜆𝜇 + 𝜆 (5)
3.4 Contents and quantification of a PRA model
In this section the contents of a PRA model and quantification of the PRA model are
introduced. The contents include BEs, IEs,  fault trees and event trees.
3.4.1 Initiating and basic events
BEs and IEs are both events on the highest resolution of a PRA model. The occurrence of
other larger events modelled in the model are determined based on occurrence of BEs and
IEs while the BEs and IEs are not broken further into more detailed events. IEs are events
that disrupt steady operation of the plant. They trigger accident sequences and require
activation of plant control and safety systems in order to prevent core damage from
occurring. [13] The amount of IEs and the scope of IE identification partly define the scope
and accuracy of the PRA model because the amount of accident sequences is relative to the
amount of IEs [39]. Grouping of IEs is then also necessary to reduce the amount of possible
accident sequences. The grouping of IEs is based on the threats the IEs pose to the reactor
core integrity and the safety functions that the mitigation of accidents requires. IEs that pose
similar threats and require the same safety functions are grouped in the same group. [40]
IEs can be either from internal or external sources. Internal IEs can be caused as a result of
a failure of an SSC, leakages, erroneous operation or fires. [39] For example, a low primary
coolant flow can be defined as an IE. If the flow is reduced enough, reduction of heat transfer
from the reactor core could lead to core damage. To prevent this, another system must be
operated to remove the heat from the core. [40] External IEs are events caused by conditions
that are external to the plant. These conditions include abnormal weather conditions,
earthquakes and high water level. [39]
BEs are events that do not initiate an accident sequence, but their occurrence has an effect
on whether the IE propagates into core damage The BEs can also be divided into internal
and external BEs. Internal BEs include human errors, maintenances and technical failures of
components. The technical failures of components include all their relevant failure modes.
External events include events external to the plant. [40]
22
Events are considered to be binary variables in PRA models. Binary variables can have two
different values, the event either occurs or does not occur. In addition to events, also sets and
clauses are considered to be binary variables. [41] For BEs, these two possible states are
defined as
- 𝑋𝑖 = 1 means that the BE occurs, for example a component is unavailable
- 𝑋𝑖 = 0 means that the BE does not occur, for example a component is available
The values are defined similarly for IEs that are represented with symbol 𝑌𝑗. However, the
occurrence of these events is measured with different parameters. The parameter used for
IEs is their frequency 𝑓𝑗 = Fr൫𝑌𝑗 = 1൯ in unit 1𝑎 and it can have values in range [0,∞). For
BEs, BE probability 𝑄𝑖 = Pr(𝑋𝑖 = 1) is used. This probability can have values in range
[0,1]. When considering component failures, or other events leading to component
unavailability, the BE probability is often determined with the unavailability.
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖 (6)
The occurrence of BEs is considered to be mutually independent, meaning that occurrence
of one BE has no impact on the occurrence of another BE. IEs are all considered to be
mutually exclusive, meaning that if one IE occurs, another will not occur at the same time.
It is also possible to set a group of BEs mutually exclusive in RiskSpectrum. [42] For
example, the different failure modes of a component modelled with separate BEs could be
considered mutually exclusive, but no BEs have been set mutually exclusive in Loviisa PRA
model.
3.4.2 Common Cause Failures
There can be intercomponent and intersystem dependencies between components which
cause the failure of one component to affect the failure probability of another. Loss of an
electrical system can impact the components that get their power from the electrical system
or an automation failure affects the functioning of another system. These dependencies are
taken into account when constructing fault and event trees. [40]
There are also common cause failures (CCFs). A CCF is an event in which two or more
components are in failed state due to a single shared cause and the failures of the components
do not happen independently of each other [41]. CCFs defeat the benefit of redundancy.
Some of the potential causes for CCFs include internal conditions, such as high temperature
or humidity, human errors, such as failed calibration of multiple sensors, and external events,
such as earthquakes or fires. [40] Defence against CCFs can be provided by utilizing the
diversity principle, staggered testing, staggered maintenance or physical barriers [41].
CCFs are modelled in the fault trees with BEs that are separate from individual failure events.
Their probabilities can be determined with parametrical models or based on operating
experience. The data on some CCFs is scarce and experiences from multiple plants may need
to be used. It is assumed in the parametrical models that ratios between rates of independent
failures and CCFs are more universal than the failure rates of independent failures. [39]
Parametric models include beta-factor model, multiple Greek letter model and alpha-factor
model. Parametric models can be applied for CCF groups. A CCF group is a group of
components that can be affected by the same CCF. [42]
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Beta-factor model is the simplest model of these three and it is described next based on [41].
In this model a factor is used that represents the ratio of CCF failure rate to independent
failure rate of a component. The total failure rate of a component is
𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝜆𝐼 + 𝜆𝑐 (7)
where 𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the total failure rate of the component, 𝜆𝐼 is the failure rate due to individual
failures of component and 𝜆𝑐 is the failure rate of the CCFs. The beta-factor is then defined
as a ratio of CCF failure rate to total failure rate and it can be interpreted as the probability
a component fails due to a common cause given that it fails.
𝛽 = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝜆𝑐𝜆𝑐 + 𝜆𝐼 (8)
In the beta-factor model the failure rate is defined for events in which all the components in
the CCF group fail. The other models include more parameters which allow to define factors
for failures of only 𝑘 out of the 𝑚 components in a CCF group. [41]
3.4.3 Event trees
Event and fault trees are both graphical expressions of Boolean algebra. Boolean algebra is
a branch of algebra that is applied for binary variables, such as the events, sets and clauses
mentioned earlier. [41] An event tree is a representation of multiple accident sequences that
originate from an IE and consist of same plant responses to the IE that have an impact on the
consequence. There are two types of event trees: system event trees and containment event
trees. System event trees are used on level 1 PRA and containment event trees are used on
level 2 PRA. [35]
An event tree visualizes how the progression of an accident sequence depends on failures
and successes of safety functions, barriers or other measures designed to prevent the
propagation of the IE. [40] By using the glossary used in RiskSpectrum, these successes and
failures are called function events and the possible end states of the plant are called sequence
top events. The probabilities of function events are defined with either fault trees or based
on a BE. [42] A sketch of an event tree is shown in Figure 6 where all the function events
represent safety functions. In actual models, the safety functions are often not identified this
clearly. The leftmost event of the event tree is the IE. Then, the IE is followed by multiple
function events. The order of function events in event trees follow a chronological order or
other logical order that follows the interdependence between the events and the order in
which the preventive actions are required [40].
A path that represents a sequence begins from the IE and branches into two branches based
on the occurrence of the function events. The upper branch represents a success of a safety
function and the lower branch represents a failure of the safety function. The excess branches
that do not have an impact on the outcome of the accident sequence, or are logically
impossible, are pruned off. At the end of each sequence the sequence is identified with a
unique ID and its consequence, the sequence top event, is defined. On level 1 the
consequence is commonly either OK state of the plant or core damage. On level 2, the
consequence is the amount and time of radionuclide release.
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A Boolean expression can be solved for the sequence top events from an event tree. There
are three basic operators used in Boolean algebra for events and they are denoted as follows:
[41]
Events A and B happen (intersection) 𝐴 ∙ 𝐵
Event A or B happens (union) 𝐴 + 𝐵
Event A does not happen (negation) −𝐴 or 𝐴̅
Figure 6 A sketch of an event tree for IE𝒀𝒋 and a fault tree for the failure of safety function 1. The event
tree is pruned of impossible or unnecessary branches. All the other safety functions would also have a
fault tree connected to them. The safety function consists of two redundant identical pumping lines that
both consist of a valve (V) and a pump (P). The fault tree top event is failure of safety function 1. Pump
A can be unavailable due to critical failure to open (PAAK), a latent failure (PAZL), or due to a CCF of
both pumps (PABAK).
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In Figure 6, core damage is defined as the sequence top event for sequences 𝑆3 and 𝑆5.
Occurrence of both sequences can be defined based on the IE, and the safety functions. 𝐸1
represents the failure of safety function 1 and 𝐸ത1 the success of the safety function. The core
damage due to events in this event tree can then be expressed as:
𝐶𝐷 = 𝑆3 + 𝑆5 = 𝑌1 ∙ 𝐸ത1 ∙ 𝐸2 ∙ 𝐸3 + 𝑌1 ∙ 𝐸1 ∙ 𝐸2 (9)
3.4.4 Fault trees
Fault trees are used to develop a deterministic description on how an undesirable event, such
as the failure of a safety function depends on the occurrence of BEs. The undesirable event
is represented with an event called fault tree top event. [40] A Boolean expression for the
occurrence of the top event can be solved from the fault tree and the top event can be
expressed as [43]
𝑇 = 𝜙(𝑿) = 𝜙(𝑋1,𝑋2, …𝑋𝑛) (10)
where 𝑇 is the top event, 𝜙() is called the structure function of the system, 𝑿 is a vector
consisting of all the BEs in the fault tree, 𝑋𝑖 is a BE and 𝑛 is the number of BEs in the fault
tree. The FT top event can then have two values: [43]
- 𝑇 = 𝜙(𝑿) = 1, the top event occurs, i.e. the system fails
- 𝑇 = 𝜙(𝑿) = 0, the top event does not occur, i.e. the system does not fail
Fault trees follow a ‘backwards logic’. The analysis begins from the FT top event. First, all
the intermediate events that can cause the FT top event are identified. Intermediate events
are caused by combinations of other events further down in the fault tree. The intermediate
events are analyzed and divided further into smaller intermediate events. This is continued
until the root causes, the BEs, for which probabilities can be estimated are identified. [31]
In a fault tree, the Boolean operators are represented with logical gates between events. The
different types of events are also expressed with their own symbols [31]. The most
commonly used symbols for events and gates are presented in Table 2. A sketch of a fault
tree is illustrated in Figure 6 below the event tree and the same symbols are used in the
sketch.
The fault tree in Figure 6 expresses the failure of safety function 1 as a function of occurrence
of BEs. Failure of the function is the FT top event. This event is divided into two intermediate
failures, both of which are failures of redundant pumping lines. If both lines fail, the safety
function also fails. Therefore, the pumping lines are considered to be parallel with respect to
reliability analysis. The intermediate events are further divided into smaller intermediate
events, the failure of a valve and a failure of a pump. Failure of either one of them is only
required for the line failure. Therefore, the pump and valve are considered to be in series.
Then, these failures of a component are divided further into different failure modes that are
represented by the BEs.
A system is called a coherent system if failures of subsystems or components do not improve
the system. Using the structure function, coherency of a system requires that that all of the
BEs are relevant, i.e. they contribute to the system state: [43]
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𝜙(𝑿,𝑋𝑖 = 1) ≠ 𝜙(𝑿,𝑋𝑖 = 0) (11)
for some𝑋𝑖. In addition, it is required that the structure function is monotonically increasing:
[43]
𝜙(𝑿,𝑋𝑖 = 1) ≥ 𝜙(𝑿,𝑋𝑖 = 0) (12)
for all 𝑋𝑖. When considering a fault tree, fulfillment of these two requirements requires that
it is constructed of AND and OR -gates. [43] If there are BEs that are considered mutually
exclusive, exclusive-or gates, or NO-gates in the fault tree, the fault tree will be non-
coherent. If the failure modes of a component were considered mutually exclusive, the
occurrence of the one with worse consequences would be prevented by the occurrence of the
one with better consequences. The occurrence of an event would therefore decrease the risk.
Table 2 Common event and gate symbols for fault trees. Symbols and definitions from [31].
Events
Symbol Description
BE. An event that requires no further division into smaller event.
Intermediate event. An event that occurs because of one or more
predecessor events connected to the intermediate event with logic gates.
Gates
Symbol Description
AND -gate. Output of the gate occurs if all the input events occur.
Redundant subsystems or components commonly require the failure of
both, and they are connected with an AND-gate.
OR -gate. Output of the gate occurs if any of the input events occur.
Components that are in series, i.e. failure of one component fails the
subsystem, are connected commonly with an OR-gate.
Transfer in from another fault tree. The fault tree is located elsewhere,
and this enables linking another event tree to a gate
3.4.5 Quantification
Event and fault trees are both deterministic descriptions of how the sequence and FT top
events can happen. In order to get numerical results from the PRA model, a Boolean
expression for the sequence top event needs to be solved from event and fault trees first.
Then the Boolean expression can be quantified by using the values calculated for BE and IE
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parameters. There can be multiple dependencies between safety functions through shared
equipment, or due to CCFs. A method for solving the Boolean expression is called fault tree
linking and it is described in [35] and also used in RiskSpectrum. In this method, the Boolean
expression for the sequence top event is solved by converting event trees into fault trees and
then linking multiple fault trees together. The large resulting fault tree is called a sequence
fault tree in RiskSpectrum [42]. Sequence fault trees, unlike system fault trees, do include
IEs.
When event trees are converted to fault trees, fault tree top events are created for the
sequence top events of interest. Then, intermediate events are created for all the accident
sequences that can lead to the top event. The intermediate events are connected to the top
event with an OR-gate. The IE and function events that occur in an accident sequence are
connected to the intermediate events representing accident sequences with an AND-gate.
The fault trees of related safety functions are connected to these intermediate events. [35]
Conversion of the event tree in Figure 6 to a fault tree, whose top event is core damage, is
demonstrated in Figure 7.
Figure 7 Event tree from Figure 6 converted into a fault tree with core damage as the sequence top event
The Boolean expression for FT top event of a fault tree can be solved by solving minimum
cut sets (MCSs). A cut set is a set of BEs and IEs whose occurrence ensures that the top
event also occurs. An MCS is a cut set from which any of the events cannot be removed
without the set losing its status as cut set. [31] MCSs define all the possible combinations of
BEs and IEs that can cause the top event to occur. A top event occurs if and only if at least
one MCS occurs. Occurrence of the FT top event can then be defined based on the MCSs:
𝑇𝑂𝑃 = 𝑀1 +𝑀2 +⋯+𝑀𝑚 (13)
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Where 𝑇𝑂𝑃 is the top event, and 𝑀 is an MCS and 𝑚 is the total number of MCSs solved
from the fault tree. MCSs can be solved for any fault trees, but when they are solved for
sequence fault trees, they include one IE and one or more BEs. The occurrence of one MCS
is measured with its frequency. The Boolean expression for a single MCS is
𝑀𝑙 = 𝑌𝑗 ∙ 𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋2 ∙ … ∙ 𝑋𝑛 (14)
And the frequency of the occurrence of this MCS is
Fr(𝑀𝑙) = 𝑓𝑗ෑ𝑄𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑓𝑗𝑄1𝑄2…𝑄𝑛 (15)
RiskSpectrum calculates the MCS frequencies generally at the same time as the MCSs are
solved in order to ignore the very rare and insignificant MCSs. When the frequency
undercuts a limit called cutoff limit, the MCS is not solved further in order to reduce
computation time and memory requirements. [42] The cut-off limit used for quantification
of Loviisa PRA model on level 1 PRA was 2 × 10−15 1
𝑎
 in 2019 [39] and the total number
of MCSs for power operating mode is over two million.
One approach for solving MCSs from a fault-tree is called the top-down approach. The
approach begins from the top event that is first solved on basis of the intermediate events
highest in the tree. Then the intermediate events are further solved based on other events,
until there are only BEs left in the equation. When there is an AND-gate, both events below
the gate are added to the cut set and when there is an OR-gate, the cut set is duplicated to
match the number of events under the OR-gate. [42]
The MCSs are grouped into groups that are mutually exclusive for calculation of the total
top event frequency. MCSs can be considered mutually exclusive if they include a different
IE or they include mutually exclusive BEs. Multiple MCSs that do not share mutually
exclusive events can occur at the same time due to the independency of BEs. Therefore, the
accurate calculation of the probability that the IE shared by a group of MCSs leads to the top
event needs to be calculated based in inclusion-exclusion principle. [42] This principle is
explained in more detail in [31].
The number of MCSs in a single PRA model is very large and therefore approximations are
used. One of the first order approximations is called rare event approximation and use of the
approximation assumes that the probability of two MCSs occurring at the same time is
insignificant. [31] The difference between how the uses of inclusion-exclusion principle and
rare event approximation assume the occurrence of three mutually independent MCSs is
illustrated in Figure 8. The total top event frequency according to rare event approximation
is calculated according to [31] as:
𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 =෍ Fr(𝑀𝑙)𝑚
𝑙=1
= Fr(𝑀1) + Fr(𝑀2) +⋯+ Fr(𝑀𝑚) (16)
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Figure 8 Occurrence of three mutually independent MCSs illustrated on a Venn-diagram based on
inclusion-exclusion principle (left) and on rare-event approximation (right)
The approximation used by default in RiskSpectrum is called MCS upper bound method
which is considered more accurate than the rare event approximation but is not as accurate
as inclusion-exclusion principle. In this method the probability of a single MCS occurring
given that the IE occurs are used to calculate the total probability that the top event occurs
given that the IE occurs. Probability an MCS occurs given that the IE occurs is the product
of the probabilities of BEs in the MCS:Pr൫𝑀𝑙ห𝑌𝑗൯ =ෑ𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝑙
(17)
The total probability of top event given occurrence of the IE occurs is then calculated as
Pr൫𝑇𝑂𝑃ห𝑌𝑗൯ = 1 −ෑ൫1− Pr൫𝑀𝑙ห𝑌𝑗൯൯𝑛
𝑙=1
(18)
where n is the total number of MCSs in the set. Multiplying this probability with the IE
frequency yields the total top event frequency contributed by this set of MCSs. The total top
event frequency is then the sum of the frequencies contributed by each set:
𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 =෍𝑓𝑗 Pr൫𝑇𝑂𝑃ห𝑌𝑗൯𝑚
𝑗=1
(19)
Where 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃  is the total top event frequency, 𝑓𝑗  is the IE frequency and m is the total number
of IEs. Both the rare event approximation and the MCS upper bound method are considered
conservative, meaning that they overestimate the sequence top event frequency. [42]
3.5 PRA model of Loviisa NPP
The PRA model of Loviisa NPP is a living PRA model, meaning that it is updated annually
to match the current operational experiences and plant data. Failure data for components is
collected from work orders and the failure rates are recalculated annually. The model is also
updated when new plant upgrades are changed, or new significant risks are identified. The
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main report for the PRA is updated annually after annual outages. The report is also delivered
to STUK each year. [32]
Figure 9 shows how the CDF and risk distribution has changed between years 1996 and
2018. The total CDF has not yet reached the 10−5 1
𝑎
 limit that is required from new plants,
but the CDF is very close to that value. Changes that increase the CDF have generally been
changes to the model, e.g. inclusion of weather effects during shutdown modes. The CDF
has also been decreased significantly due to changes made to the plant unit.
Figure 9 Progression of Loviisa NPP CDF and risk distribution. Red line marks the target value for CDF
of new plants 𝑪𝑫𝑭 = 𝟏𝟎−𝟓 𝟏
𝒂
 [39]
The PRA model is constructed as based on large fault trees and small event trees principle.
The event trees are partly integrated to a large fault tree, Figure 10 shows how an event tree
is represented in the model. This example is for core damage due to a large LOCA in the
power operating mode. The IE, and a fault tree for the conditional probability of the IE
leading to core damage are all connected to an AND-gate. This structure itself is connected
with an OR-gate to an intermediate event that represents all the internal initiators during
power operation. Figure 11 then shows how the conditional probability is formed from
different types of failures of functions. This kind of integration of event trees into a large
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fault tree should not have any impact on the solving of MCSs and should not have effect on
the results.
The BE probabilities and IE frequencies are calculated outside of RiskSpectrum even though
RiskSpectrum offers the ability to input event parameters and calculate the probabilities
within the application. The BEs and their probabilities are collected to an excel-sheet called
PSADATA [44]. In the 2019 model revision the number of BEs modelling LO1 components
was around 7600 and the number for LO2 unit was around 7200. IEs are collected to excel-
sheet T15X2 [45]. The total number of IEs was around 600. The probabilities or frequencies
are determined for all the events and for all operating modes of the plant [39].
Figure 10 An event tree of a large LOCA integrated to the large fault tree
Figure 11 Conditional probability of large LOCA leading to core damage (the intermediate events are
censored)
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4 Risk Importance Measures
One of the main objectives of a PRA is to identify the SSCs most important to safety. RIMs
are one of the measures that can be used for this objective. RIMs are calculated for the BEs
and IEs and are used in multiple applications. There are three main categories for application
of RIMs identified in [46]:
1. Optimization of plant design by adding or removing SSCs
2. Optimization of plant performance by adjusting test and maintenance strategies
3. Evaluating the effects of daily changes to configuration
A fourth category, uncertainty analysis, was also included in [40]. Concrete applications of
RIMs include risk-informed in-service inspections (RIISI) of piping sections and
components, risk-informed allowed outage time optimizations and risk-informed preventive
maintenance.
There are multiple RIMs that are commonly discussed in literature and can be calculated by
RiskSpectrum or are calculable from the RiskSpectrum results. These RIMs measure the
importance of an event from multiple different perspectives and have different kinds of uses.
This chapter will first introduce the definitions and calculation of these RIMs for BEs and
IEs, and the different interpretations of the values. Then, the application of RIMs to measure
SSC importance on different levels of SSC hierarchy is discussed. Next the RIMs to be used
in the comparison chapter are selected. Then, the effects that the safety class of a component
can have on the RIM values of the events modelling the component are discussed. In the last
section, a foreign application of RIMs in safety categorization of SSCs is introduced.
4.1 Calculation of risk importance measures
RIMs can be used to define the importance of any BE or IE, but the objective of this thesis
only requires applying RIMs for the events used to model SSCs. Events such as weather-
related events are ignored. And since in nuclear PRA the risk is measured with CDF and
LRF, the RIMs are used to measure their impact on the CDF or LRF. The interpretations of
RIM values are then also discussed based on nuclear PRA and its risk metrics. The RIMs
are calculated and interpreted slightly differently for BEs and IEs and therefore the RIMs for
BEs are described first, and then the differences of IE RIMs are described.
4.1.1 Importance measures for basic events
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the PRA model is different for different operating modes.
Therefore, the RIMs are calculated for each operating mode separately. Then RIMs
measuring the importance of an event across all operating modes can be calculated from the
operating mode specific RIMs. Some expressions will be used when describing the
calculation of different RIMs in this section:
- 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 refers to sequence top event frequency in operational mode 𝑝. Unit for 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝
is 1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
.
- 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃  is the sequence top event frequency including all operating modes
- 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1) is the increased top event frequency when the probability of BE 𝑋𝑖
is set to its maximum value, that is 1. Probabilities of all the other events including
other failure modes of the component are set to their base values.
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- 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 0) is the decreased top event frequency when the probability of BE 𝑋𝑗
is set to its minimum value, that is 0. All the probabilities of other events including
other failure modes of the same component have their base values
- 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(base) is the base top event frequency when all BE probabilities are at their
base values
- 𝑄𝑖𝑝(base) is the base probability of 𝑋𝑖 in operational mode 𝑝
RiskSpectrum calculates the adjusted 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 values by adjusting the BE probability and
quantifying the MCSs again. The MCSs are not solved again based on the new conditions
and this results in some inaccuracies. A large share of MCSs that include a very rare event
undercut the cutoff limit and they are not included in the calculations either when the
probability is changed to unity. This results in an underestimation of the value of
𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1൯. Therefore, for rare events the RIMs calculated based on 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1൯
are not always very accurate. Accurate calculations of this value would require that the whole
model is solved again with the probability set to unity.
In addition to the previously mentioned expressions, a linear equation for risk is adopted
from [46] and adjusted to express 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 as a function of the BE probability. This equation
is:
𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝൯ = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏𝑖𝑝 (20)
where
- 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(𝑄𝑖𝑝) is the top event frequency in operating mode 𝑝 as a function of
probability of 𝑋𝑖
- 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝  is the contribution of MCSs that include 𝑋𝑖 to the total top event frequency
- 𝑎𝑖𝑝 is the slope of the equation
- 𝑄𝑖𝑝 is the probability of 𝑋𝑖 in operating mode 𝑝
- 𝑏𝑖𝑝  is the contribution of all MCSs that do not include 𝑋𝑖 to the total top event
frequency in operating mode 𝑝
A sketch plot for this equation is shown in Figure 12. This equation divides the top event
frequency into two parts: frequency contributed by the MCSs that include 𝑋𝑖 and the MCSs
that do not include the event. Changing the BE probability changes the first part, but not the
second. The equation is considered to be valid in [46] when all the BEs are independent and
the model is coherent. The value of 𝑎𝑖𝑝 depends on the number of MCSs the event is included
in, the number of events in the MCSs and the parameters describing the occurrence of the
events. When considering components in an NPP, the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑝 depends on the location
of the component in the plant, and the system structure around the component. For example,
redundancy increases the number of events in the MCSs, and therefore decreases the value
of 𝑎𝑖𝑝. 𝑄𝑖𝑝 depends on the component itself. These two factors, system structure and the
unavailability of the component generally guide the importance of the component.
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Figure 12 Plot of equation y. Drawn based on [46].
4.1.1.1 Fussell-Vesely
Fussell-Vesely importance measure (FV) of a BE is defined as the conditional probability
that at least one of the MCSs that include 𝑋𝑖 has occurred given that the sequence top event
has occurred [47]. In [48] FV is also defined as the fraction of total risk contributed by MCSs
that contain 𝑋𝑖. When total risk is measured with sequence top event frequency, FV can be
calculated as:
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉 = Fr(⋃ 𝑀𝑙)𝑖∈𝑙𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(base) (21)
where Fr(⋃ 𝑀𝑙)𝑙|𝑖∈𝑙  is the total sequence top event frequency contributed by the MCSs that
include 𝑋𝑖. Because FV is calculated as a ratio, the values are relative to the base top event
frequency and it can have values in range [0,1]. Another method for calculating FV that is
included in [46] is defined as follows:
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉 = 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝(base) − 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 0൯𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(base) (22)
In the numerator, the frequency contributed by MCSs that do not include 𝑋𝑖 is removed from
the base frequency, leaving only the frequency contributed by the MCSs that do include 𝑋𝑖.
This second method is also referred to as fractional contribution (FC) in [49] and criticality
importance in [50].  RiskSpectrum can be used to calculate FV based on both of the methods
[42] and both of the methods should produce very similar values in coherent PRA models
according to [49]. Some deviations may still exist due to the use of MCS upper bound
method instead of rare event approximation. Both methods of calculating FV can be
expressed using symbols from equation (20) according to [46] as:
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𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉 = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝(base)𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝(base) + 𝑏𝑖𝑝 (23)
When 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 ≪ 𝑏𝑖𝑝, this is reduced to [46]
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉 ≈
𝑎
𝑏 𝑄𝑖𝑝 (24)
The condition is true for most of the component related BEs in an NPP because the
redundancy for the failure of a single component is high and it is very unlikely that a single
failure mode of a single component contributes a large share of the total risk [46]. The value
of FV therefore depends on the system structure and component unavailability. The values
of FV are directly proportional to the unavailability.
It is described in [51] that FV can be used to show  the relative reduction in risk when BE
probability is reduced to zero and the relative increase in risk when the BE probability is
doubled. Thus, FV can be used to define the maximum available relative decrease in risk by
improving a component and to identify SSCs that provide the highest potential in reducing
the risk by improving the availability of the SSC. After the improvement, the values of FV
should drop and the SSC would not be seen as important anymore according to FV. [51] FV
can also be used to identify SSCs that are the most likely to cause the sequence top event,
and the repair of those SSCs is most likely to prevent the sequence top event. FV can
therefore be utilized to prioritize inspection programs. [50]
When considering all plant operating modes, the FV value is calculated as a weighted
average of operating mode specific FV values with the operating mode specific sequence
top event frequency as the weighting factor [39]
𝐼𝑖𝐹𝑉 = ∑ ൫𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൯𝑝∑ 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝 (25)
Where the numerator is the total frequency contributed by the MCSs that include the BE
across all operating modes and the denominator is the total top event frequency across all
operating modes.
FV can also be used to solve all the other RIMs when the values of FV, BE probability and
top event frequency are known. Solving the equation pair
ቐ
𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏𝑖𝑝
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉 = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏𝑖𝑝  (26)
yields
൞
𝑎𝑖𝑝 = 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝
𝑏𝑖𝑝 = ൫1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉൯𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 (27)
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Other RIMs also have this property, but RiskSpectrum rounds the RIM values to four
significant digits. Other RIMs, such as Risk Reduction Worth (RRW), and Risk
Achievement Worth (RAW), have their minimum value at 1. Therefore, all values below
1,0005 are all rounded down to 1,000. Use of such values to calculate FV, for example,
would be counter-intuitive due to the loss of information.
4.1.1.2 Risk Reduction Worth
Risk Reduction importance measure (RR) shows how much the total risk would decrease if
a BE would never happen [46]. When the BE is used to model a component failure, risk
reduction shows the decrease in risk if the component was made perfect with respect to the
failure mode. For example, a pump would never fail to start. RR shows the absolute decrease
in top event frequency and it is calculated as [46]:
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑅 = 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(base) − 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 0൯ = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 (28)
It is more common to express risk reduction as a relative value. Then it is called RRW where
the word “worth” refers to the worth of decreasing the unavailability by improving the
component. [46] According to [40] the use of relative RIMs, like FV and RRW, has the
advantage of being more robust than the absolute measures and therefore they are preferred
over absolute measures [40]. Another term used to refer to RRW is risk decrease factor.
RRW is calculated as [46]
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑊 = 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(base)𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑖𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 0൯ = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑏𝑖𝑝 𝑄𝑖𝑝(base) + 1 (29)
RRW can have values in range [1,∞). The value of RRW shows the maximum available
decrease in risk achievable by improving the component. [52] In addition, RRW can be
expressed as a function of FV [46]
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑊 = 11− 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉 (30)
It can be seen from this relation that RRW and FV will give the same ranking for
components. Both of the RIMs can be used to measure relative risk reduction, but FV is
more commonly used for that purpose.
4.1.1.3 Risk Achievement Worth
Risk Achievement importance measure (RA) is similar to RR but RA measures the absolute
increase in risk when a BE always occurs, i.e. the probability is 1 [46].
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐴 = 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1൯ − 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝(base) = ൫1− 𝑄𝑖𝑝൯𝑎𝑖𝑝 (31)
It is assumed in this equation that the component is always in failed state with respect to the
failure mode modelled with 𝑋𝑖, but the value can also be interpreted as the momentary
increase in risk due to a failure. Risk achievement is also more commonly used as a relative
importance measure called RAW. The term ‘worth’ now refers to the worth of maintaining
the BE probability at its current value [52]. Another term used to refer to RAW in [53] is
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risk increase factor that refers to the factor by which the risk increases due to failure of a
component. RAW is calculated as a ratio between increased risk and base risk similarly to
RRW [46] as
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐴𝑊 = 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1൯𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝(base) = 𝑎𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝(base) + 𝑏𝑖𝑝 (32)
Like RRW, RAW can have values in range [1,∞). When 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 ≪ 𝑏𝑖𝑝, RAW can be reduced
to [46]
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐴𝑊 ≈
𝑎𝑖𝑝
𝑏𝑖𝑝
+ 1 (33)
RAW can be used to measure the relative impact of failure of a component to the sequence
top event frequency, which can also be considered the consequence of the component failure.
RAW can also be used to measure the importance of bringing a component back to functional
state after a failure. However, RAW does not consider the duration or probability of the
failed state of a component. This can be seen from the equation (33), where the BE
probability is not included. RAW value of a BE is little dependent on the BE probability and
more dependent on system configuration. A high RAW value indicates a weak defence-in-
depth for failure of the component and the value could be decreased by for example adding
another redundant component. Two events connected to an OR-gate have identical MCSs
when the event itself is excluded from the MCSs. Therefore, the RAW values for such events
are very similar, but not completely identical.
RAW for all operating modes is calculated similarly to FV as a weighted average [39]:
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐴𝑊 = ∑ (𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐴𝑊𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝)𝑝 ∑ 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝𝑝 (34)
Where ∑ (𝐼𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐴𝑊𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝)𝑝  is the sum of the operating mode specific RAW values multiplied
by the operating mode specific top event frequency and ∑ 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝𝑝  is the total top event
frequency.
4.1.1.4 Birnbaum importance measure
Birnbaum importance measure (BI) is considered the first RIM and it was introduced by
Birnbaum in 1969 [54]. Birnbaum introduced both a structural importance (SI) and reliability
importance, the latter being referred to as BI in this thesis. SI is defined as a ratio between
the number of system states where component is critical to the system failure and the total
number of possible system states. A component is considered critical when the system is in
such state that the component failure would lead to system failure. [54] Applied to nuclear
PRA, this means that the plant is in such a state that component failure would lead to core
damage, i.e. all the other events in an MCS containing the event have occurred. Because of
the definition, calculation of SI does not require knowledge on event parameters and the
value is based on deterministic information.
BI is defined as the probability that the system is critical with respect to component failure
and it is calculated as the difference between system failure probability when component
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failure probability is equal to unity, and when it is equal to zero. [54] For nuclear PRA this
is the frequency in which a component is challenged to function in order to prevent the
sequence top event from happening [55]. Applying the calculation method of BI to nuclear
PRA yields
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐵𝐼 = 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1൯ − 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 0൯ (35)
BI can have values in range [0,∞) and the unit is 1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
. According to equation (35) the value
of BI is also the change in sequence top event frequency when the component state changes
from functioning to failed. Because 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 is a linear function of 𝑄𝑖𝑝, BI can also be
expressed as the partial derivative of 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 with respect to 𝑄𝑖𝑝 as it is defined in [40]
Therefore, another definition used for BI is the partial derivative of the total risk with respect
to BE probability [56]. As can be seen, the value of BI does not depend on the probability
of a BE. The value depends on the MCSs that the event is included in, and the probabilities
and frequencies of all the other events in the MCSs. Events that are not included in the MCSs
have no impact on the value of BI. Therefore, events under the same OR-gate should have
identical BI values. Like RAW, BI is a measure of redundancy for a component failure. A
small value of BI implies a high level of redundancy for the component failure and a high
value of BI implies a low level of redundancy.
BI can also be calculated as a function of FV and BE probability. This is used in Loviisa
PRA model to calculate the BI values for both BEs and IEs [39].
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐵𝐼 = 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑄𝑖𝑝 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝(base) (37)
Applying equation (35) for the total top event frequency including all operating modes would
yield
𝐼𝑖𝐵𝐼 =෍𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1൯
𝑝
−෍𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝൫𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 0൯
𝑝
=෍𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐵𝐼
𝑝
(38)
Therefore, BI across all operating modes can be calculated as a sum of operating mode
specific BI values.
4.1.1.5 Differential Importance Measure
Differential Importance Measure (DIM) was introduced in [57]. DIM has two interpretations
DIMI and DIMII. Both of them are based on the idea of increasing a BE or an IE parameter
by a small amount and calculating the change in total top event frequency. The change in
risk is compared to sum of all changes in risk when all events are individually adjusted by
the same amount. For calculating DIMI the parameter is increased by a small absolute
amount. [57]
𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐵𝐼 = 𝜕𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 𝜕൫𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏𝑖𝑝൯𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 𝑎𝑖𝑝 (36)
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𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼 = 𝜕𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑝
∑ 𝜕𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖
(39)
Where 𝑥 is the parameter that is being changed. For BEs, this parameter can be any of the
parameters that the BE probability is calculated from, or the BE probability itself. For
calculating DIMII, the parameter is changed by a fraction of its base value. [57]
𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐼 = 𝜕𝑅𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝
∑ 𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑝
𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖
(40)
Because of how DIM is defined, the sum of all DIM values calculated for BEs or IEs is 1
[57].
෍𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼
𝑖
=෍𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐼
𝑖
= 1 (41)
Another result of the definition of DIM is that it is summative, the values can be added up
to calculate the DIM value for multiple events [57]. Currently there are some inconveniences
related to calculating DIM. Firstly, calculation of DIM for parameters that the unavailability
is calculated from is impossible. Calculating DIM on that accurate parameter level would
require that the sequence top event frequency is in parameter form. Secondly, DIM is not
built in any PRA software. [48] However, DIM can be calculated as a function of FV. DIMI
can be calculated as described in [56]:
𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼 = 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑥𝑖𝑝
∑
𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐹𝑉
𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖
(42)
and DIMII as
𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉∑ 𝐼𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑖 (43)
This enables the calculation of DIM for BEs without rerunning the PRA model with new
adjustments. Calculation of DIMII as a function of FV implies that the ranking by DIMII is
equal to ranking components by their FV values, because the numerator is equal for every
BE [56]. Ranking by DIMI is also identical to ranking BEs by
𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐹𝑉
𝑄𝑖𝑝
. When considering the
parameters in equation (20) DIMI can be expressed as
𝐼𝑖𝑝
𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼 = 𝐹𝑖𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑄𝑖𝑝 = 1𝑄𝑖𝑝 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏𝑖𝑝 = 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 (44)
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Ranking events based on DIMI would then be equal to ranking by BI. Considering these
factors, it can be concluded that DIM does not bring any extra utility to RIMs in classification
of SSCs when it is calculated based on the RIMs that have already been calculated.
4.1.2 Importance measures for initiating events
The calculation and interpretations of RIMs differ between BEs and IEs. The differences are
discussed shortly in this subsection. Equation (20) is modified to apply for IEs. The factors
in the equation have different dimensions for IEs due to occurrence of IEs being measured
by their frequency. The equation can now be expressed as
𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 = 𝛼𝑗𝑝𝑓𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽𝑗𝑝 (45)
where
- 𝛼𝑗𝑝𝑓𝑗𝑝  is the contribution by MCSs that include 𝑌𝑗 to the total FT top event frequency
in operating mode 𝑝. The unit of 𝑓𝑗𝑝 is
1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
 and 𝛼𝑗𝑝 is dimensionless
- 𝛽𝑗𝑝  is the contribution to FT top event frequency by other MCSs in operating mode
𝑝. The unit of 𝛽𝑗𝑝  is
1
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
FV can be calculated for IEs identically as it is calculated for BEs and it is comparable with
BE FV values because it is dimensionless.
𝐽𝑗𝐹𝑉 = Fr൫⋃ 𝑀𝑙𝑗∈𝑙 ൯𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝 = 𝛼𝑗𝑝𝑓𝑗𝑝𝛼𝑗𝑝𝑓𝑗𝑝 + 𝛽𝑗𝑝 (46)
RAW cannot be defined for IEs. For calculation of RAW, the parameter describing the
occurrence of the event is set to the value that is worst theoretically possible, i.e. the
maximum value. For probability, the value is 1 and for frequency it is infinity. Infinite IE
frequency would imply an infinite top event frequency and thus also infinite RAW. [42]
Calculation of BI does not require setting the parameter to its maximum value if it is
calculated based on Equation (41). BI can thus be calculated for IEs as
𝐽𝑗𝑝𝐵𝐼 = 𝐽𝑗𝑝𝐹𝑉𝑓𝑗𝑝 𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃,𝑝(base) = 𝛼𝑗𝑝 (47)
The value is now dimensionless and can have values in range [0,1]. According to [58] when
BI is calculated for IEs, it measures the conditional probability of the sequence top event
given the IE. RIMs called conditional core damage probability (CCDP) and conditional large
release probability (CLRP) measures the same probability, but CCDP and CLRP are
calculated by assuming the IE has occurred. CCDP and CLRP are included for example in
[39]. The value of BI can be used to approximate the value of CCDP when calculated on
level 1, and CLRP when calculated on level 2.
𝐽𝑗𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐷𝑃 = Pr൫𝑇𝑂𝑃ห𝑌𝑗 = 1൯ ≈ 𝐽𝑗𝑝𝐵𝐼 (48)
41
CCDP for multiple operating modes is also calculated differently from BI for BEs as a
weighted average with operating mode duration as the weighting factor. This weighted
average is used for example in the RIISI-program for Loviisa NPP [59].
𝐽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐷𝑃 = ∑ ൫𝐽𝑗𝑝𝐶𝐶𝐷𝑃Δ𝑇𝑝൯𝑝 ∑ Δ𝑇𝑝𝑝 (49)
Where Δ𝑇𝑝 is the duration of operating mode 𝑝.
4.2 Importance of SSCs and functions
The RIMs are generally calculated for BEs and IEs while safety classes are determined on
different levels of SSC hierarchy. This section describes and discusses the methods for
applying the RIMs of BEs to determine the importance of SSCs. First the importance of a
component is discussed, then the importance of a system and finally the importance of a
safety function.
4.2.1 Component importance
A component can be modelled by multiple different BEs representing the individual failures
and CCFs of the different failure modes of the component. As an example, Figure 13 and
Figure 14 contain the different failure modes of pump TH12D0001 in two different accident
sequences. The importance of a component needs to be measured based on the multiple
different BEs modelling the component. Direct comparisons between BE RIMs and the
safety class of the related component would result in the less important failure modes of a
component being compared to the safety class the component has because of its most
important failure modes. The safety classification depends on the most important functions
of the component. Therefore, considering the objective of this thesis, such comparisons are
not preferable.
RiskSpectrum has a built-in ability to calculate RIMs for a group of BEs. The calculation is
based on setting the probabilities all the events below the gate that represents the component
as unity or zero. This includes also setting probabilities of the CCF events as unity or zero.
[42] This method can be considered overly conservative. This kind of calculation does not
include minimization of the MCSs based on the new conditions and therefore the cut set
representation may not be minimal anymore.
There are multiple alternate methods for calculating component importance based on the
RIMs calculated for BEs. In Chapter 5 of this thesis, the RIM values of all components in
the model are considered when the RIM values are compared to the safety classes. Therefore,
it is not beneficial to require recalculating the whole model for calculating the importance of
each component separately. Next, some of methods for calculating RIMs on component level
are discussed. DIM is not included in this subsection due to the additivity being described
already in the previous section when DIM was introduced.
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Figure 13 Failure of pump TH12D0001 to start or run
Figure 14 Failure of pump TF12D0001 to stop
4.2.1.1 Component FV
The calculation of FV for a component is relatively straightforward. Because calculation of
FV does not require changing the unavailability of any component, applying it for multiple
events is simple. FV is defined on component level as the share of sequence top event
frequency contributed by the MCSs that include at least one of the events modelling the
component. [50] In this thesis, 𝑍𝑘 is used to refer to the set of BEs that model component 𝑘
and 𝐾𝑘 is used to refer to the importance of the component.
𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 = Fr൫⋃ 𝑀𝑙𝑖∈𝑘,𝑖∈𝑙 ൯𝑓𝑇𝑂𝑃 ,𝑝 (50)
Where Fr൫⋃ 𝑀𝑙𝑙|𝑖∈𝑘,𝑖∈𝑙 ൯ is the total frequency contributed by the MCSs that include any of
the BEs used to model the component. If all the MCSs only include one of the BEs in 𝐾𝑘,
the FV values can be added up to define the FV for the component.
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𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 =෍𝐼𝑖𝐹𝑉
𝑖∈𝑘
(51)
None of the MCSs should have two BEs from 𝑍𝑘 occurring simultaneously or else some of
the MCSs will be included twice. [50] When all the BEs from 𝐾𝑘 are under the same OR-
gate, or they are included in different event trees, they should not be included in the same
MCSs.
4.2.1.2 Component RAW
The calculation of RAW on component level is more complex due to the BE probabilities
being adjusted for the calculations. Accurate calculation of RAW for a group of BEs is
discussed in [52]. It is suggested that the RAW of a component is calculated by changing all
the BEs in the group to have the same BE ID, and the probability of this event is set to unity.
Then, the MCSs are solved for the whole model and the sequence top event frequency is
recalculated. The new top event frequency can then be used to calculate the RAW value of
the group of BEs. [52] However, this method would require that the whole PRA model is
ran once for every component included in the model.
Five methods for calculating component RAW without having to rerun the model are
collected in [60]. In the first one the component RAW is defined to be the sum of all RAW
values for the related BEs, including CCFs [60]. BEs under the same OR-gate generally have
the same RAW and this method would result in multiplying that RAW value by the number
of Bes. Considering that the minimum value of RAW is 1, this method would result in the
total RAW of the pump in Figures 13 and 14 to be at least 3 when only the failure events are
considered for the calculation of RAW.
In the second method RAW is defined to be maximum of all the related BE RAW values,
including CCFs. The third method is like the second one, but CCFs are ignored. In the fourth
method, two values for RAW are determined: maximum of the individual failures and
maximum of the CCFs. [60] Ignoring the CCF events when considering the maximum
component RAW would result in large underestimations of the component importance. Due
to redundancy the importance of a single pump can be very low, but the importance of the
group of the pumps can be very large. Therefore, when considering the maximum RAW
values it is beneficial to consider the maximum RAW of individual failures and CCFs
separately.
The fifth method is called balancing method, and in this method the component RAW is
calculated based on the component FV. Balancing method utilizes the additivity of FV
values and the connection between the FV and RAW values. The RAW of a component is
calculated as [60]
𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑏𝑎𝑙 = 1 + 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉൫1−𝑄𝑘(base)൯𝑄𝑘(base) (52)
Where 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 is the FV-importance of the component calculated as sum of all FV values of
the events modelling the component, including CCFs. 𝑄𝑘  is the total failure probability of
44
the component and it is calculated as the sum of all BE probabilities modelling the
component. [60]
𝑄𝑘 =෍𝑄𝑖
𝑖∈𝑘
(53)
Another method based on balancing approach is called the weighted average method and it
was introduced in [61]. In this method, RAW is calculated as a weighted average of BE
RAWs with their probability as weighting factor.
𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑤𝑎𝑚 = ∑ ൫𝑄𝑖𝐼𝑖𝑅𝐴𝑊൯𝑖∈𝑘∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑖∈𝑘 (54)
It is also noted in [61] that the values of both methods are very similar for a union of mutually
exclusive BEs modelling a single component. While Loviisa PRA model has no BEs set
mutually exclusive, the events generally exist in different MCSs due to them being located
under a shared OR-gate, or being used in different accident sequences.
4.2.1.3 Component BI
It is shown in [56] that the definition of BI as a partial derivative of risk with respect to BE
probability cannot be extended to apply for multiple BEs, because partial derivatives are
calculated for one variable at a time. When considering the top event frequency as a function
of multiple BEs, there are multiple BE probabilities used as variables. [56] Therefore, it is
suggested to use DIMI instead of BI for ranking components by the sensitivity of the top
event frequency to changes in the component failure probabilities. [56]
[56] discusses BI based on the definition as a partial derivative. However, if the definition
based on system criticality was considered instead, maximum BI values could be selected
for a component, analogously to selecting maximum RAW values. Maximum BI value of a
component individual failures would then show the frequency in which the system is critical
with respect to the most frequently challenged failure mode of the component. Maximum BI
value of the CCF events would show the frequency in which the system is critical with
respect to the CCF group. When the BEs are connected to a single OR-gate, they all have
approximately the same value of BI. The total probability of at least one of the BEs occurring
would then be the probability that the component fails when challenged. For the pump in
Figure 13 the total probability that the pump fails to start or run is the sum of the probabilities
of events TH12D001AK, TH12D001DK and the probabilities of the CCFs. But the total
probability of failure of all the four pumps would be a more complex process to calculate.
4.2.2 System and safety function importance
While there is plenty of literature about the importance on component level, there are a lot
less studies on the importance of a system. In addition, according to [62] there are no widely
accepted definitions for system importance. It is also discussed that an FV-like measure
could be defined for the system by calculating the sum of all MCSs that include an event
modelling the system failure. A BI-like measure could be determined for the system to
measure how often the system is critical. [62]
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An RRW-like or FV-like measure could also be calculated for the system by setting all the
probabilities of events modelling the components in the system to zero and recalculating the
model and comparing the new top event frequency to the old one. Also, an RAW-like
measure could be calculated by setting the probabilities to unity. For correct minimization
of the MCSs the event IDs of each such event should be changed to be identical with each
other. Similarly, the BI-like measure could be defined based on the reduced and increased
top event frequencies. Additivity of FV values requires that the BEs do not exist in the same
MCSs. Many components in a system are redundant and therefore their failure events share
some of the MCSs. Therefore, additivity of FV cannot be directly applied to calculate the
system FV based on the BEs modelling the system components. Instead, every MCS should
be tested individually whether they include one or more events modelling the group or not.
Similarly, the weighted average method and balancing method for calculating RAW cannot
be extended to apply to systems because the methods include similar assumptions.
A system can be used for executing multiple different safety functions. The deterministic
safety class of a system depends on the most important function it is used to execute.
Assuming total failure of the system by setting all the probabilities of events related to the
system to unity assumes that the system is unable to perform any of the functions it is
required to. Only setting the events related to the most important safety function to unity
only assumes the failure of the most important safety function. Identifying events that
prevent the system from executing its most important functions can be used to solve the
RAW value for the failure of the system to execute the specific function. Use of the RAW
values of such events avoids having to recalculate the model to measure the importance of
every system and every function separately.
It was suggested in [4] that the importance of a system for risk-informed safety classification
can be determined based on the most important component of the system. The RIMs used
were CCDP and event probability. CCDP of the system was approximated as the CCDP of
the most important component, and system failure probability as the sum of failure
probabilities of each component that can cause the system failure. [4] When using FV and
RAW as the RIMs, an analogous method would be to determine the system RAW as the
maximum RAW of the BEs that model the system and system FV as the maximum
component-level FV of the components in the system.
Safety function importance is also discussed very little in literature. If the PRA model
structure includes safety functions as gate events, then setting this gate event to TRUE or
FALSE and recalculating the model would provide the increased or decreased top event
frequency. The components modelled by BEs can be common to multiple different safety
functions and therefore adjusting their probabilities would result in the failure probability of
the other safety functions being changed too. For example, out of 5673 OLs listed in [63],
3427 (60%) OLs are common to more than one safety function.
4.3 Selection of importance measures for the comparison
RIMs generally measure the component importance from two different perspectives. A
division of RIMs into two categories is used in [52] where it is described that they either
measure risk or safety significance. An SSC is considered risk significant if the imperfection
of the component contributes significantly to the CDF or LRF. Safety-significance is related
to the role that an SSC has in prevention of accidents. [52] RIMs included in this thesis that
46
measure risk significance include FV, RR, and RRW. RIMs that are used to measure safety
significance include RA, RAW, BI and CCDP and CLRP.
A common aspect for the risk significant RIMs is that their values depend on the probability
of the event in question. The values of safety significant RIMs are little or not at all
dependent on the probability. However, due to the cutoff limit, all the RIM values are also
affected by the event probability to some degree. When considering equation (20), the values
of risk significant RIMs are dependent on the term 𝑎𝑖𝑝𝑄𝑖𝑝 , and the values of safety
significant RIMs are dependent only on the term 𝑎𝑖𝑝. The safety significant RIMs are
therefore only dependent on the system structure.
While the RIM values itself carry a lot of information, their relative rankings are the more
important when considering their categorization. On BE level the risk significant RIMs all
provide very similar rankings for the events. However, some deviations should exist due to
how the values are rounded differently.
Similarly, BI and RAW should yield very similar rankings. As shown by equations (36) and
(44), RAW is slightly dependent on the BE probability whereas BI is not dependent on the
probability at all. Therefore, there should exist some differences between the rankings even
if the values were calculated to a larger number of significant digits. Figure 15 plots the
rankings of BEs by their RAW and BI values in power operating mode. There is a clear
correlation between the two ranks, but at higher ranks the effect of rounding of RAW values
can be seen. On component level the rankings would then also be similar if the same methods
are used to determine the component level BI and RAW. While the rankings are not
completely identical, using both RAW and BI instead of only one of them would not bring
much additional value to the identification of component significance.
Figure 15 Rankings of BEs by their BI and RAW values during power operating mode. BEs with either
𝑰𝒊𝑩𝑰 = 𝟎 or 𝑰𝒊𝑹𝑨𝑾 = 𝟎 were ignored.
Both the risk and safety significance of an SSC should be understood when considering the
safety classification of the SSC and this requires the use of at least two RIMs. A common
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combination of RIMs used widely in literature is FV and RAW. This combination is also
used for risk-informed safety categorization in the United States as described in Section 4.5.
There are also multiple studies for the use of FV and RAW to measure the importance of a
component that is modelled by multiple different BEs. This combination will also be used
in this thesis to measure the risk and safety significance of components based on BEs. RAW
cannot be calculated for IEs and therefore the CCDP is used instead when considering the
safety significance based on the IEs a component can cause.
4.4 Effect of safety class on importance measure values
The RIMs are all functions of system structure, while some RIMs are also affected by the
failure probability of the event in question. While the RIM value may not be affected by the
probability of the event itself, the probability still has some effect to the importance of other
events that belong to some of the same MCSs. In this section the requirements that are set in
YVL-guides based on the safety class and the impact the requirements can have on the RIM
values are discussed.
The system structure has a large impact on which events an MCS consists of. [15] covers
requirements on plant and system design. This includes requirements for system
configuration, such as requirements on separation and failure criteria of components.
However, the failure criteria are based on safety functions and what they are designed to
achieve, rather than being based on the safety class. For example, systems that are designed
to bring the plant to controlled state and maintaining the controlled state after a severe
accident need to fulfil (N+1) failure criterion. While such systems are classified to SC3, it is
not a direct consequence of the safety class of the systems. There are also requirements that
do not specify a specific safety class, instead they are applied for all safety classified SSCs
of a specific kind. For example, there should not be cross-links between safety classified
redundant electric systems unless the links are beneficial for safety.
YVL E -guides [64] include requirements for NPP structures and components. The following
guides include requirements that directly affect the safety classified components:
- YVL E.3: Pressure vessels and piping of nuclear facility
- YVL E.5: In-service inspection of nuclear facility pressure equipment with non-
destructive testing methods
- YVL E.7: Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility
- YVL E.8: Valves of a nuclear facility
- YVL E.9: Pumps of a nuclear facility
- YVL E.10: Emergency power supplies of a nuclear facility
- YVL E.11: Hoisting and transfer equipment of a nuclear facility
The failure probabilities of components are functions failure rate, test run interval and repair
rate as shown in equation (1). The test run interval usually causes the largest share of the
total unavailability. If the interval is halved, the unavailability is also approximately halved.
This also leads to ~50% reduction in the frequencies of all the MCSs that the component is
included in. If a real-time monitoring can be added for the component, the share of
unavailability caused by the test run interval is practically eliminated. There are some
requirements that affect the test run intervals of safety classified components, but the interval
does not completely depend on the safety class. Some less important components are tested
at the same time as other more important components are tested due to this being more
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practical than to test them on separate intervals. The intervals have also been adjusted based
on the PRA results.
The other time-related factor of equation (1) is the repair rate. This is primarily affected by
the allowed repair times set in operating limitations and conditions [36]. These allowed
repair times set an upper limit for the time in which the failure must be repaired. The repair
times are mainly determined based on the failure criterion of the system and partly on PRA
results, therefore safety class has little impact on the allowed repair times. [36]
There are also requirements on the supplier of the component, standards that are followed,
structure and material design of the component, construction planning, testing, installation,
maintenance and spare parts. The factor that such requirements have the greatest effect on is
probably the failure rate. While the safety class has an effect on the selected maintenance
program, or programs, the programs in Loviisa NPP are also guided by a criticality class that
is set separately from the safety class. The criticality class depends on aspects such as
availability requirements, safety requirements, requirements by official and maintenance
costs. Therefore, the effect the safety class has on failure rate through maintenance
requirements is not clear. The maintenance programs include:
1. Preventive maintenance (based on time)
2. Condition based maintenance (based on condition monitoring)
3. Corrective maintenance (component is operated until failure)
4. Curative maintenance (aspects that can improve availability, maintainability and
organization performance are selected to improve the availability of the components
by optimizing O&M costs)
There have been few studies on the effect of safety class on the failure rate. In [65] the failure
rate difference between SC3 and commercial-grade components were set to be compared,
but it was found that the methods for collecting failure data were fundamentally different in
NPPs and in other industries. [65] Some values for failure rates of safety classified
components can be determined based on the failure data of components in Loviisa PRA
model. Figure 16 includes some values calculated from the failure rates of valves whose
failure rate is determined based on plant data. There is no direct connection between the
safety class and failure rate identifiable from this data. The failure rate also depends on
multiple other factors, such as where the valve is located in the plant, what kind of conditions
it is operated at and how it is operated. However even if the calculational failure rate is little
affected by the safety class, the higher standards help ensure for example new spare parts
are also high quality and the component will not fail due to weak spare parts when repaired.
There are many other factors that affect the failure probabilities in addition to the safety class
of a component. Therefore, identifying the effect that the safety class has would be a very
complex process. When considering the RIM values, the source of data also has a great factor
on the value of failure rate. Generic data tends to be more conservative, while plant data is
more accurate. Therefore, there is much variance in amount of conservativity and uncertainty
of the failure rates. There are also negative aspects about changing the current safety class
considered in [66], including increased requirements on the spare parts, that may increase
the repair times and make finding suppliers more difficult [66]. It can be concluded that
while both safety class and RIM values depend on the component and its location within the
plant, the safety class has no direct influence on the RIM values.
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Figure 16 Failure rates of valves in the PRA model whose failure rate is determined based on plant data,
and their safety classes. Class 4 on x-axis refers to the class EYT. The used data is based on the data
whose collection is described in Chapter 5.2
4.5 Risk-informed safety categorization in USA
While STUK has not provided detailed instructions on use of PRA in safety classification,
PRA has been utilized for risk-informed safety classification in the United States. In 2004,
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) introduced rule 10 CFR 50.69 [67] that
enabled the use of PRA for risk-informed safety categorization of SSCs. U.S. Nuclear
Energy Institute provided guideline NEI 00-04 [68] as instructions on how to perform the
safety categorization by utilizing RIMs calculated with PRA. The objective of the rule 10
CFR 59.69 was to relax the requirements on less important SSCs that do not significantly
affect the risk while identifying SSCs that have a significant effect on the safety [69].
Prior to 10 CFR 50.69 the SSCs were categorized into two safety classes based on
deterministic methods. The classes were safety-related and non-safety-related SSCs. Safety-
related SSCs are defined as SSCs that are required to remain operational during design basis
events to secure the integrity of reactor coolant pressure boundary, to shut-down the reactor
or to mitigate the consequences of accidents. 10 CFR 50.69 did not replace the two classes,
but rather divided both categories into two subcategories. Safety-related SSCs were
classified to risk informed safety classes RISC-1 and RISC-3, while non-safety-related SSCs
were classified to classes RISC-2 and RISC-4. [68] The official definitions for the classes
from [67] are:
9
- RISC-1: safety-related SSCs that perform safety significant functions
- RISC-2: non-safety-related SSCs that perform safety significant functions
- RISC-3: safety-related SSCs that perform low safety significant functions
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- RISC-4: non-safety-related SSCs that perform low safety significant functions
Here, the safety significance is used to refer to both kinds of significance described in the
previous subsection. One part of determining whether or not an SSC is significant includes
comparing the FV and RAW values calculated from plant-specific PRA to values provided
in [68]. When considering the FV and RAW limits, the FV-RAW plane is divided into two
sectors as illustrated in Figure 17. The limits for identifying candidate safety significant
SSCs are [68]:
- Sum of FV values for all BEs modelling the SSC, including CCFs is higher than
0,005
- Maximum of RAW values for BEs modelling the SSC, excluding CCFs, is higher
than 2
- Maximum of RAW values for all BEs modelling the SSC, including CCFs, is higher
than 20
Figure 17 Dividing FV-RAW plane into two sectors with limits defined in NEI 00-04
Only one of the limits is required to be exceeded for the SSC to be considered safety
significant. If the component failure can cause an IE, the FV of the IE is also compared to
the FV criterion. In addition to comparing the FV and RAW values, multiple additional
aspects need to be analyzed, such as operating experience and expert panel evaluations.
Sensitivity studies should also be performed by adjusting the BE probabilities, such as
setting all maintenance events to 0, and recalculating the model. The safety-related SSCs are
mainly categorized as RISC-1, unless a strong basis for categorizing it as RISC-3 can be
shown. [68] The SSCs that are not modelled in PRA are categorized completely on the basis
of their deterministic importance [70]. Other criteria used to determine if a component is
significant are collected in [71] and [70]. In [71] the criteria are given for FV and RAW
separately, like in the American RISC, while in [70] some criteria are based on combinations
of FV and RAW that both need to be exceeded. The different FV and RAW criteria from
[70] and [71] are collected in Appendix 1.
Applying a similar risk-informed classification system in Finland would be analogous to
dividing each of the current safety classes into two classes, resulting in total of 8 different
risk-informed safety classes. Therefore, such limits cannot be directly applied to a Finnish
NPP and they are not suitable to be used directly for safety classification in Finland.
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5 Comparisons and suggested guiding values
In this chapter the RIM values and safety classes of components are first compared to each
other based on RIMs calculated for BEs and IEs separately. This is because while most of
the BEs are used to model different failure modes of individual components, IEs are used to
model more general failures in larger entities, such as leakages in large piping sections of
the primary circuit. Also, the CCDP and RAW values cannot be compared directly with each
other. The comparisons are primarily focused on level 1 PRA, but the level 2 is also
discussed briefly. Then, guiding values to be used in assistance in safety classification are
suggested based on the findings from the comparison and the values are tested against the
current classification. Finally, the results and potential sources of errors are discussed.
5.1 Comparison based on basic events
The comparison based on BEs is carried out in this section. The data sources and
organization of data are described first, and then the component-level RIMs are compared
to their safety classes and the also systems are briefly compared to the safety classes of their
parts used to execute the most important functions.
5.1.1 Data
The data sources consist of two different parts: data about OLs and data from the PRA model.
The data from OLs was obtained from multiple different sources listed below:
1. LOMAX asset management system [29]: KZ-IDs, descriptions, component types and
safety classes of process system components and of some electrical and automation
system components
2. Electrical safety classification document and its attachments [72]: missing electrical
safety classes of some process system components, safety classes of electrical SSCs
3. Automation safety classification document and attachments [63]: some missing
automation system OLs, missing automation safety classes of some process system
components, safety classes of automation cabinets and the safety functions of all
SSCs
4. LO1-K8048-00018 [66] attachments 1 and 5: Deviations between safety classes of
OLs in Loviisa NPP compared to the requirements set in YVL B.2
The OL related data was collected in Excel into a worksheet with an array of all OLs and
their safety classes. The highest safety class, with highest referring to the most important
class, was selected to be used in the comparisons. If the safety class required by [3] was
higher than the one used in Loviisa NPP according to the list in [66], the safety class required
by [3] was used. This is more in line with the objective of obtaining understanding about
how the safety classes defined in YVL B.2 are in line with the RIM values.
The PRA related data was also collected from multiple sources listed below:
1. PSADATA: BE IDs, descriptions, probabilities, failure rates, additional information
about the event, and the source for failure data (plant data / generic data)
2. Loviisa PRA main report [39] chapter 12 attachments 1 and 2: RIMs for BEs on PRA
levels 1 and 2
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The data from PSADATA was processed first in order to select the BEs to be used in the
comparison, and to associate each of them with one or multiple related OLs. Only the events
were included that are related to technical failures and for which RIMs have been calculated.
Recovery events related to component recoveries after failures were also ignored. The failure
events were then classified as either individual failures or CCFs. A single matching OL was
associated with each individual failure based on the event ID and description. If there were
multiple OLs that would match the event due to multiple redundancy numbers, the one with
the highest safety class was selected. CCFs were handled similarly, but now multiple OLs
were associated with the event.
There are components whose KZ-ID only consists of the subsystem part of the ID. For
example, switchgear 10BA11 is considered one component with respect to the safety
classification. An individual switch 10BA11Q0001 is not classified separately. According
to  [20], rather large electrical entities can be considered components if they form a logical
whole based on purchasing, installation, operation and quality assurance. There are also
multiple automation cabinets that are classified on cabinet-level. Therefore, whether the
component is classified on subsystem (10BA11) or component (10BA11Q0001) level was
identified in addition to the OL. There are also some OLs identified in the PRA model that
do not match any OLs in the Lomax system or the safety classification documents. For such
events, an imaginary OL was added to the list exported from the Lomax system and the
safety class for this imaginary location was selected based on the OL one level higher in the
hierarchy.
An Excel-macro was created to reorganize the data into a single worksheet. The output of
this macro is an array consisting of every OL modelled explicitly in the Loviisa PRA model,
their safety classes and a list of BEs used to model the OL. If the classification is done on
subsystem level of the KZ-ID, then the list includes the subsystem and events are selected
based on the most important OL within the subsystem. The most important OL was selected
based on component-level FV values. For a large share of subsystems, the most important
component according to FV values was also the most important component according to
RAW values. Therefore, there was no need to use two different components within the
subsystem to identify the importance according to RAW and FV separately.
Two EYT systems were ignored from the comparison. These are systems that have been
noted as important according to the PRA results and corrective actions have been performed
in order to maintain them according to their importance without changing the safety class.
In addition, the system YZ that only includes signals in the model was ignored and also all
components with 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 = 0 were ignored. Table 3 below shows the number of components
from each safety class modelled explicitly in the PRA model. According to Table 3, the
current safety class deviations from YVL B.2 primarily decrease the safety class of SSCs.
The SSCs that are classified as SC1 according to YVL B.2 do not have their safety classes
changed.
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Table 3 Number of components of each safety class modelled in the Loviisa PRA model with BEs
Safety class Number of components
when the class is selected
based on YVL B.2
Number of components when the
class is selected based on
classification in the plant
SC1 71 71
SC2 575 462
SC3 370 475
EYT 199 207
The BE IDs were then used to fetch the BE RIM values from their respective sheets, and the
component level RIMs were calculated based on the BE RIMs. The RIMs are calculated for
single operating modes, and the total RIM value can be calculated from the operating mode
specific values. The power operation covers around 90% of the total time of operation, but
only less than 50% of total CDF. Therefore, the RIM value that is used for a BE is selected
as the maximum of either the total RIM, or the power operating mode RIM.
There are also some BEs in the model that refer to leakages in different piping sections
within the system. The leakage can be caused by individual leakages in multiple different
pipes in the piping section or by multiple different components in the piping line. Failure
rate for leakages is determined as a sum of the failure rates of individual piping sections or
components. The leakage event was added as an individual failure to each component that
can cause the leakage, but the probability and FV-values were multiplied by this share of
total failure rate. The RAW values are only little dependent on event probability and
therefore they were not multiplied by any factor.
5.1.2 Comparison based on component importance
Next the safety classes of components are compared to the BE RIM values. The component-
level FV was calculated using equation (51). Three different values of RAW were calculated
for each component. Therefore, the four RIMs used are:
1. 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 is the sum of FV values of all BEs that model both the individual and common
cause failures of the component. Also referred to as ∑FV in figures and tables
2. 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  is the maximum RAW value of the BEs that model individual failures
of the component. Also referred to as max(RAW,single) in figures and tables
3. 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑤𝑎𝑚 is the RAW value according to the weighted average method. Also
referred to as RAW,wam in figures and tables
4. 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑎𝑙𝑙 is the maximum RAW value of the BEs that model both individual and
common cause failures of the component. Also referred to as max(RAW,all) in
figures and tables
The relationships between safety classes and RIM values can be analyzed through absolute
RIM values, relative rankings and distributions. The absolute RIM values are analyzed first.
Figure 18 shows the 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 and 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑤𝑎𝑚 values plotted on an FV-RAW plane. 𝐾𝑘𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑤𝑎𝑚
was selected to be used for plotting purposes because it combines both individual and
common cause failures.
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Figure 18 Components mapped on an FV-RAW plane
What can be seen from the FV-RAW plane is that the RIM values of components are not
completely in line with their significance. For example, there are multiple EYT and SC3
components that are considered more significant according to their RIM values than some
of SC1 and SC2 components. A component having a higher safety class than another does
not always mean that it is also more significant according to the RIM values. It can also be
seen that there are both SC2 and SC3 components that are considered more significant than
the most important SC1 components. This is better illustrated in Figure 19 where the
components are ranked according to their FV and RAW values and the ranks are plotted on
plane where the x-axis is the ranking by FV values and y-axis is the ranking by RAW values.
The ranks are calculated with the RANK.AVG function in MS Excel that returns the average
rank of multiple SSCs if they share the same RIM value.
The effect of the rounding of RAW values can also be seen from Figure 19 where the
components that rank lowest according to RAW all share the same ranking because their
RAW values are very low and therefore they round down to 1,000. It can also be seen that
components can rank very differently according to their FV and RAW values There are
components that are ranked in top 100 based on FV, but the rank based on RAW is over 800.
While a component can be one of the most likely ones to cause the sequence top event given
that it happens, the consequences of one failure are not that large. It can be found by
analyzing the data that components with high probability and low consequence failures rank
high on FV, but low on RAW. The biggest differences in ranks are due to events with events
that have probabilities that are conditional to the IE (e.g. the value is 0,5). Components that
rank high on RAW, but low on FV are components with mediocre RAW and very low
probability. It is also noticeable that components from each safety class include both
components ranked relatively high and components ranked relatively low based on either
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RIM values. The SC2 components still cover the largest share of components that rank in
top 200 based on both of the RIM values.
Figure 19 Relative ranking of components based on their FV and RAW values
A large share of the most significant EYT components are from the ventilating and heating
systems. Some electrical components and emergency cooling towers are also included in the
most important EYT components. The electrical and air conditioning systems have effects
on the functioning of other systems. If the distribution centers or emergency power
generators do not function, then they also cannot supply power to the other systems. If the
ventilation of a room fails, then components in those rooms are also subject to potential
failures. If the RIM values were taken into account in safety classification, then probably the
classification of these components and their systems should be increased.
SC3 also contains some ventilation components whose RIM values are very great compared
to the other components in the same class. Components classified as SC3 and that are
required for heat removal from the primary circuit are also considered important according
to their RIM values. Interestingly there are also multiple components that should be
classified as SC2 according to [3] but are classified mechanically as SC3 in the plant and
have 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑎𝑙𝑙  values that would rank them into the top ten most important components of
the plant according to 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑎𝑙𝑙 . The electrical and automation safety classes of these
components are still SC2 and it is possible that reclassifying them as SC2 mechanically
would not have any effect on the safety of the plant or the effect would be only minimal.
While the safety classification is not completely in line with the RIM values of the
components, on average the components in higher safety classes have higher RIM values
than the ones in the lower safety classes. This indicates that if two components were selected
randomly from two different safety classes, the component from the higher class would be
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likely to be more significant according to the RIM values. This is shown in Table 4 where
measures of middle and spread are collected. The measures include maximum, average,
median and the 90th percentile1 calculated on basis of BE RIMs.
Table 4 Values calculated based on the absolute values of RIMs included in the comparison
max(RAW,single)
Safety class Max Average Median 90th percentile
SC1 78,62 4,14 1,02 8,32
SC2 275,62 3,17 1,01 1,76
SC3 29,41 1,53 1,01 1,23
EYT 2,44 1,06 1,00 1,15
ALL 275,62 2,38 1,01 1,42
max(RAW,all)
Safety class Max Average Median 90th percentile
SC1 78,62 5,62 1,13 8,79
SC2 275,62 29,40 1,26 166,29
SC3 239,87 3,59 1,01 2,94
EYT 27,10 1,31 1,01 1,30
ALL 275,62 15,55 1,04 23,48
RAW,wam
Safety class Max Average Median 90th percentile
SC1 9,85 1,78 1,02 3,51
SC2 275,62 3,27 1,06 3,88
SC3 29,41 1,33 1,01 1,30
EYT 2,44 1,06 1,01 1,17
ALL 275,62 2,23 1,01 2,23
∑FV
Safety class Max Average Median 90th percentile
SC1 7,3E-02 3,3E-03 7,3E-05 3,3E-03
SC2 7,9E-02 1,1E-03 1,9E-05 1,4E-03
SC3 1,1E-01 7,0E-04 4,2E-06 4,5E-04
EYT 1,2E-01 6,6E-04 2,2E-06 6,7E-05
ALL 1,2E-01 1,1E-03 9,1E-06 9,3E-04
The values calculated for Table 4, except for maximums, are slightly biased because the
components that are modelled with BEs in the PRA model only cover a small share of the
total components in the actual plant. Ratio between number of components in the model and
in the actual plant is the smallest for EYT components. Therefore the averages, medians and
percentiles would decrease the most for EYT components if the whole plant was modelled
and the values in Table 4 were calculated based on all components of the plant. This factor
needs to be noted when interpreting the values. If it is assumed that the components modelled
with BEs in the PRA model are the most significant ones in prevention of IEs from
propagating into accidents, then it can also be assumed that the rankings in Figure 19 are
still unaffected by the lack of modelling every component in the plant. The 10th most
1 For example, the 90th percentile of 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 shows the value of 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 that 10% of components within safety class
exceed
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important component would still be the 10th most important one. This assumption is not
completely true due to there being some components that are modelled implicitly in the
model.
The maximums, averages, medians and 90th percentiles are for the most part in line with the
safety classification. One exception is SC1. SC1 is only used as a structural safety class and
BEs are more related to failures of components to execute certain functions that are required
in order to prevent the IEs from propagating into accidents. The failures of valves to open,
pumps to start, etc. are usually caused by failures of their actuators to function rather than
structural failures of the valves and pumps. Therefore, it can be considered that the
significance of SC1 components cannot be seen that clearly from the BE RIMs. Their
significance is notable when analyzing IEs that are more often related to structural failures,
e.g. leakages.
When considering only SC2, SC3 and EYT components the values are in line with the safety
class with the maximums of𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 values being an exception. The maximum of SC2 is higher
than the maximum of SC3. The maximums can be set by a single very significant component
and therefore are not that informative. The 90th percentile is still higher for SC2 components
indicating that there are only few SC3 components with FV value that high.
The RIM values can also be compared to the limits used in NEI 00-04 [68]. The resulting
shares of components in each safety class that would be considered safety significant
according to their RIM values are shown in Table 5. Very few components in the class EYT
are considered safety significant according to the criteria, but also only around a quarter of
SC2 components are considered safety significant. The percentages are in line with the safety
classes of components. The share of safety significant components increases as the safety
class increases. When considering the three different criteria that can set a component safety
significant, the 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 criterion is clearly exceeded by the least number of components.
However, the FV contributed by the IEs is ignored here. Therefore, especially the number
of SC1 and SC2 components that exceed the FV criterion may be actually higher.
Table 5 Comparison of component RIM values to the USA limits for safety significant components
Safety class Total
components
Exceed
RAW,single
criterion
Exceed
RAW,all
criterion
Exceed FV
criterion
Exceed
any
criteria
SC1 71 23,94 % 5,63 % 8,45 % 26,76 %
SC2 575 9,91 % 19,65 % 3,83 % 26,09 %
SC3 370 3,78 % 2,16 % 0,81 % 5,95 %
EYT 199 0,50 % 0,50 % 0,50 % 1,51 %
ALL 1215 7,33 % 10,37 % 2,63 % 15,97 %
The 90th percentiles were included in Table 4. The other percentiles can be seen from Figure
20, Figure 21 Figure 22 and Figure 23 that show the distributions of components within each
safety class according to each RIM included in the comparison. The distributions show the
shares of components from each safety class that exceed a specific RIM value.
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Figure 20 Distributions of component𝑲𝒌
𝑹𝑨𝑾,𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 values
Figure 21 Distributions of component𝑲𝒌
𝑹𝑨𝑾,𝒘𝒂𝒎 values
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Figure 22 Distributions of component𝑲𝒌
𝑹𝑨𝑾,𝒂𝒍𝒍 values
Figure 23 Distributions of component𝑲𝒌𝑭𝑽 values
The distributions are also biased because only a small share of components is included in
the PRA model. The effect of this can be seen in the distributions of SC3 and EYT
components that are very similar based on maximum individual failure RIMs until
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𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 = 1,4. If all the components of the Loviisa NPP were included in the model,
then the number of components whose RIM values are equal or very close to the minimum
would increase for each safety class. The curves would then be moved downwards and the
EYT curves would be moved downwards the most. The differences between the distributions
seem to be the smallest for𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒  values, but when CCFs are included in determination
of component-level RAW, the differences between safety classes are more noticeable.
The safety class of a component can affect the safety classification of other nearby
components due to requirements for safety class borders set in YVL B.2. Therefore, the
significance of one component can have an effect on the classification of a nearby
component. For example, the significance of a pump also guides the classification of a valve
connected in series with the pump. In order to take this factor into account the components
are grouped into approximate groups in this subsection. Doing this will ignore the less
important components that are classified into higher safety classes because they are required
to belong to the same class as another component.
It would be very difficult to select the exact groups of components that form groups that are
required to belong into the same class. For this comparison, the components in the PRA
model are grouped on basis of the subsystem-level KZ-ID, the component type
(mechanical/electrical/automation) and the safety class. For example, valves 11TH20S0002
and 11TH20S0003 belong both to the group TH20,M,SC2 because they have the same
subsystem ID, are both process components and have the same safety class. The RIM values
for each group are now determined based on the most important components within the
group according to each different RIM. Distributions of RIMs calculated for component
groups are shown in Figures 24, 25, 26 and 27 below.
Figure 24 Distribution of maximum of 𝑲𝒌
𝑹𝑨𝑾,𝒔𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒍𝒆 values of component groups
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Figure 25 Distribution of maximum 𝑲𝒌
𝑹𝑨𝑾,𝒘𝒂𝒎 values of component groups
Figure 26 Distribution of maximum 𝑲𝒌
𝑹𝑨𝑾,𝒂𝒍𝒍 values of component groups
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Figure 27 Distribution of maximum 𝑲𝒌𝑭𝑽 values of component groups
It can be seen that the differences between safety classes are greater when the component
groups are used. This indicates that there are multiple less significant components in the
higher safety classes that would be required to belong to these classes even if the RIM values
were considered. However, there are still component groups in the higher safety classes that
can be considered less significant than the component groups in lower safety classes
according to the RIM values.
5.1.3 Comparison based on system importance
Next the safety classes of systems are compared to the RIM values calculated for the systems.
The systems are identified based on their system level KZ-IDs. Therefore, the automation
systems were ignored because the automation system hierarchy is slightly different. Because
systems can consist of subsystems and components from multiple safety classes, the safety
class used for a system was based on the highest safety class of the system components
modelled in the PRA model. SC2 was selected as the system safety class if the highest safety
class was SC1 because SC1 is not used for systems.
The FV of a system is determined based on the most significant component according to
𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 and the RAW of a system is determined based on the most significant component
according to 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑎𝑙𝑙 . It was also found that for most of the systems the safety class of the
most significant components according to 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉 or 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑎𝑙𝑙  had also the highest safety class
within the system. Therefore, for the most part the safety class assumed for the systems is
also the safety class of the part of the system that is used to execute the system’s most
important functions.
The systems are shown on an FV-RAW plane in Figure 28. It can be seen that all of the most
important systems belong to SC2. There is only one SC3 and no EYT systems with RAW
exceeding 2. For EYT systems the maximum RAW is around 1,4. There are also some SC2
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systems with very low significance, but overall, the systems from higher safety classes also
have higher RIM values.
Figure 28 Systems plotted on an FV-RAW plane
5.2 Comparison based on initiating events
5.2.1 Data
The data used in the comparison based on IEs was also obtained from multiple sources:
1. LOMAX [29]: safety classes of components
2. T15X2_19 [45]: IE IDs, descriptions, frequencies
3. Loviisa PRA main report [39] chapter 12 attachments 1 and 2: RIM values of IEs on
PRA levels 1 and 2
4. LO1-K854-961-00094 [59] attachments B01-B33: piping segments used in RIISI
program and their safety classes
A single IE can be caused by one or multiple different OLs. Some IEs can be considered
fault trees of their own where different kinds of combinations of failures can cause the IE.
The event itself is still modelled with a single event rather than forming the fault tree within
the large fault tree. The event then has only one RIM value, and the different failures are not
identified separately. For the RIM values to be comparable to component safety class, the
RIM values need to be divided or adjusted according to how the IE is related to failures of
different components. Three different ways an IE can be related to a component can be
identified:
1. IEs that are a result of a failure of a single component
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2. IEs that are a result of failures of multiple components occurring simultaneously due
to common or separate causes. This kind of IEs can be considered to consist of one
IE and multiple BEs connected to an AND-gate
3. IEs that are a result of a failure of a single component in a group of components. This
kind of IEs can be considered to consist of multiple IEs connected to an OR-gate.
For example, ITK10Z00FK “TK10-line break outside containment” can be a result
of multiple different parts of TK10-line breaking.
For type 1 IEs the CCDP and FV values remain unchanged because they refer only to one
component. Type 2 IEs are calculated based on one event identified with frequency and
multiple other events identified with probability. For these events, the FV remains constant,
but the CCDP value needs to be adjusted according to the probability terms included in the
event frequency. The probability terms can be considered to be moved from the term 𝑓𝑗𝑝  to
the term 𝛼𝑗𝑝 in equation (45). Frequency is divided by the product of the probability terms
and term 𝛼𝑗𝑝 is multiplied by the product.
The frequencies of type 3 IEs are essentially a sum of failure frequencies of multiple
components. For this kind of events the CCDP is constant for each component, but the FV
value needs to be adjusted according to the frequency that each of the failures contribute to
the total IE frequency. Some of the type 3 IEs are calculated as a sum of failure frequencies
of individual components. For these IEs, the calculations were used to determine the failure
frequency of an individual component and to identify the number of components included
in the IE. This enabled to calculate the ratio between frequency contributed by a single
component and the total IE frequency. This ratio was then used to calculate the FV of a
single component.
Dividing the FV values of some other IEs among the components that can cause the IE is a
more complex process. These IEs are not calculated based on the frequencies contributed by
individual components. Instead, operating experiences based on larger entities, such as the
primary circuit, and from multiple plants are used in order to determine the frequency.
Therefore, the calculations of the IE frequencies cannot be used directly to find the share
total frequency caused by a single component. Instead the FV value was divided among
components with assistance of piping segments that are used for RIISI. When the RIISI-
programs were created, the systems within the plant were divided into piping segments and
consequences of leakages in each segment were identified with the CCDP value of IEs that
the leakage can cause. For this comparison, the segments that each IE can be caused by were
identified based on this information and approximate numbers for the amount of component
in each segment were calculated. The sum of components from each segment that can cause
the IE was used to find the total number of components that can cause the IE. The FV per
component was calculated as
𝐹𝑉 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐹𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝐼𝐸𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐼𝐸 (55)
The data about IEs was then used to form an array that consists of component level FV and
CCDP values and safety classes of all components that can cause IEs. If it was identified
that a component or components from a RIISI segment can cause multiple different IEs, the
CCDP value was selected as the maximum of the CCDP values and the FV values of the
different IEs were added up.
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5.2.2 Comparison
In this section, the safety classes of components that can cause IEs are compared to the
component level RIM values of the IEs they can cause. There are multiple IEs that can be
caused by multiple different components and the components can be from different safety
classes. The number of IEs that components from each safety class can cause, and the total
number of components that can cause those IEs are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 Number of components included in the comparison from each safety class
Safety
class
Number of IEs that
components can cause
Number of components
that can cause IEs
SC1 15 277
SC2 75 1029
SC3 21 358
EYT 27 395
The components that can cause IEs are plotted on an FV-CCDP plane in Figure 29. Some
IEs can be caused by components from multiple safety classes and all the components
therefore have the same FV and CCDP values. The safety classes may then overlap each
other at multiple points and the FV-CCDP planes have shown separately for each safety class
in Appendix 2. It needs to be noted that the points on the plane can also consist of multiple
components from the safety class which is not visible when the classes are shown on separate
planes either.
Figure 29 Components on an FV-CCDP plane
It can be seen from the FV-CCDP planes that the RIM values are not completely in line with
the safety classes when considering the IEs the components can cause either. Multiple
components from the higher safety classes can cause IEs whose RIM values are lower than
the RIM values of IEs that components from lower classes can cause.
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The SC3 and EYT components have very similar RIM values based on the IEs they can
cause. The FV and CCDP values of components from both classes are below the value of10−4 for the most part. CCDP limit of 10−4 is actually also used as the limit for identifying
piping segments whose leakages have high consequences in the RIISI program [59]. There
are some SC3 and EYT components whose RIM values exceed this limit. Some components
in class EYT belong to piping segments whose leakages can cause very small leakages
outside the containment buildings or very small LOCAs. The CCDP of these IEs exceeds10−4. The number SC3 components that can cause IEs whose CCDP exceed 10−4 is slightly
larger but they can also cause few different IEs: steam leakages from steam generator blow-
down lines and a small or very small LOCAs.
The highest ranking SC1 and SC2 components also can have very similar CCDP and FV
values, but highest values are those of SC1 components. On average the SC1 components
still have higher RIM values than the SC2 components. This is shown by values collected in
Table 7. This is similar to how the BE RIMs were found to related to the safety class.
However, the FV values of EYT components in the model seem to be higher on average than
the FV values of SC3 components. But for example, the number of SC3 components that
exceed the 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝑃 = 10−4 limit is higher than the number of similar EYT components.
Table 7 Measures of middle and spread calculated for IE RIMs when all components that can cause Ies
are included
CCDP
Safety class Max Average Median 90th percentile
SC1 1,0E-01 3,1E-03 5,7E-04 1,9E-03
SC2 2,4E-02 6,0E-04 2,9E-04 5,7E-04
SC3 5,1E-03 1,5E-04 3,3E-06 3,9E-04
EYT 5,3E-04 2,8E-05 7,9E-06 3,0E-05
ALL 1,0E-01 7,5E-04 6,0E-05 5,7E-04
FV
Safety class Max Average Median 90th percentile
SC1 1,3E-02 2,1E-03 1,3E-04 5,5E-03
SC2 8,0E-03 7,6E-04 9,6E-05 4,4E-03
SC3 1,4E-03 5,5E-05 4,4E-06 1,3E-04
EYT 2,6E-04 6,3E-05 3,5E-05 1,9E-04
ALL 1,3E-02 7,0E-04 8,8E-05 4,4E-03
Distributions of the component FV and CCDP values calculated based on IEs are shown in
Figures 30 and 31. It can be seen from the figures also that the CCDP values are more in line
with the safety classes of components. The distribution of EYT components is slightly above
the distribution of SC3 components at the lower CCDP values, but there is still more SC3
components that have higher CCDP values. The distributions of FV values are almost
identical for SC3 and EYT components that can cause IEs.
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Figure 30 Distributions of CCDP values of components
Figure 31 Distributions of FV values of components calculated based on IEs
Some components were most likely included twice in the comparison because the exact KZ-
IDs were not identified. There may also have been some deviations between the actual
numbers of components in the RIISI segments and the number that was used in this thesis.
This may have caused some deviations in the FV-values of components. The pipes between
the components were also ignored which may overestimate the FV values of the IEs some
components can cause. Assuming for example that 30% of every leakage IE frequency is a
result of pipe ruptures would result in the FV values of individual components being
decreased by the same amount. The CCDP values of individual components are not affected
by the possible errors in calculation of total number of components and by the ignoring of
68
pipe ruptures. Therefore, the CCDP values should be more accurate. It could also have been
possible to identify the exact OLs that can cause each IE, but considering the numbers in
Table 6 it would have been a very time consuming task and the changes to the results may
not have been that large.
Some differences can be noticed when the distributions created based on IE RIMs are
compared to the ones created based on BE RIMs. The distributions of FV values calculated
for all components modelled with BEs and IEs are compared to each other in Figure 32.
Similar figures for all safety classes separately are provided in Appendix 3. Some differences
between the distributions are guaranteed to exist due to the modelling with BEs being based
on specific failure modes of individual components rather than using one BE to model
multiple components. Due to multiple components in each safety class sharing the same RIM
values the distributions are also a lot rougher. The differences between the number of high
FV components are the biggest for SC2 components. For components in all safety classes
the highest-ranking components seem to have higher FV values based on BEs than based on
IEs. This is probably because important components can be used in response to multiple
different IEs in multiple accident sequences, while the IEs only belong to one accident
sequences. However, the IEs also belong to all MCSs that are solved based on one accident
sequence and therefore the FV value can in some cases be higher when calculated based on
IEs.
Figure 32 Distributions of component-level FV values calculated for all components modelled with BEs
and for all components modelled with IEs
5.3 Suggestion for guiding values
Based on the comparisons previous two sections it can be concluded that every safety class
has components that can be considered more significant than some components in a higher
safety class. The RIM values of components in each safety class cover a wide range of
different RIM values with the lower limit for the range for each class being very close to the
minimum value possible for the RIM in consideration. However, the upper limit varies
depending on the safety class. These upper limits can be used to identify how large RIM
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values can components in each class currently have. These upper limits can then be used
when considering the classification of components in a new system, or reclassification of
existing components. If there are currently no EYT components with very high RIM values,
it would not be sensible to classify a new component with a very high RIM value into that
class.
Upper limits are also used in the American guidelines to determine whether or not a
component can be considered non-safety significant according to the RIM values [68].
Following how the limits divide the FV-RAW plane into two sectors in [68], the FV-RAW
and FV-CCDP planes can be divided analogously into sectors for each safety classes as
illustrated in Figure 33. The upper limits for safety classes should be set based on both BEs
and IEs. If any of the upper limits set for a safety class is exceeded, then the component
should be placed into a higher safety class according PRA. Also, the RIM values of other
components that the component needs to share the class with should be taken into account.
Such limits could primarily be used to give indication whether there is a need from PRA
perspective to safety classify the component. Undercutting all EYT upper limits would not
directly mean that a component should be classified as EYT, but that it can be classified as
EYT from PRA perspective. If a component should be classified to a different safety class
according to BEs and IEs, the higher safety class should be used analogously to selecting the
higher safety class from the functional and structural safety classes.
Figure 33 FV-RAW and FV-CCDP planes divided into sectors
The highest safety class is SC2 in the FV-RAW plane because it was found that multiple
SC2 components rank higher than SC1 components based on the BE RIMs. SC2 is also the
highest safety class for automation- and electrical systems and therefore even if an electrical
component exceeds the IE RIM limits for SC2, it should still be classified as SC2.
Multiple different methods of determining component level RAW were used in Section 5.1.
The RAW values can be selected as maximums of individual failure RAWs and CCF RAWs
separately, or with the weighted average method. Therefore, there are two different
combinations of RIMs that can be used to measure component risk and safety significance
based on BEs:
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1. 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 , 𝐾𝑘𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉
2. 𝐾𝑘
𝑅𝐴𝑊,𝑤𝑎𝑚 and 𝐾𝑘𝐹𝑉
In order to find out which combination of RIMs matches the current classification better,
two questions can be asked about the suggested limits on BE RIM values to test how well
they match the current safety classification
1. If components were reclassified strictly based on the suggested limits, how large
share of components in a safety class would keep their safety class?
2. If components were reclassified strictly based on the suggested limits, how much
would the number of components within a safety class change?
The upper limits for safety classes SC3 and EYT were selected based on the 90th percentiles
calculated for component groups. Maximum values are very absolute, but percentiles give
some tolerance for anomalies within each safety class. Using the 90th percentile ignores the
top 10% most important component groups in both safety classes thus giving some tolerance
against the anomalies. The components in the same group were also assumed to be
reclassified into the same new group.
Percentages that show the answers to the two questions above are collected in Table 8 below.
These were calculated by comparing the RIM values of each component to the suggested
limits. Components from SC1 were not assumed to be reclassified in the calculations. It can
be seen that both methods to calculate component RIM match the current classification quite
well. More components would keep their current safety class if the RAW was calculated as
maximums. Also the total number of components in SC2 and SC3 would decrease less.
Table 8 Upper limits based on BEs tested against current classification
When upper limits are selected based on the 90th percentiles of ∑FV, max(RAW,single)
and max(RAW,all) of component groups
Safety
class
∑FV limit max(RAW,
single) limit
max(RAW,all)
limit
Share of
components
that would keep
the same SC
New count /
old count of
components
SC2 - - - 57 % 79 %
SC3 8,51E-04 1,30 3,19 21 % 55 %
EYT 5,93E-05 1,15 1,21 77 % 248 %
When upper limits are selected based on the 90th percentiles of ∑FV and RAW,wam of
component groups
Safety
class
∑FV limit RAW,wam
limit
Share of components
that would keep the
same SC
New count / old count
of components
SC2 - - 45 % 64 %
SC3 8,51E-04 1,41 24 % 69 %
EYT 5,93E-05 1,17 82 % 266 %
The upper limits for IE RIM values can be determined similarly, but an upper limit can also
be determined for SC2. It would probably be very difficult to reason for reduction of the
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safety class of an SC1 component and increasing the safety class of an SC2 component to
SC1 would not probably be worth the increased safety it possibly achieves. The PRA results
are already considered in the RIISI programs and the RIM values are taken into account.
Therefore, there should be a very strong basis to consider reclassifying an SC2 component
as SC1 instead and the SC2 upper limit for FV and CCDP values is suggested based on the
maximum of the FV and CCDP values of SC2 components. The component FV values
calculated from IE RIMs are very subject to errors in the calculation of total number of
components per RIISI segment. Therefore, the FV upper limits for IEs should be probably
be selected to match the FV limits calculated based on BEs. The suggested upper limits for
IEs and percentages showing how well they match the current classification are shown in
Table 9 below. SC1 was also ignored from these calculations.
Table 9 Upper limits based on IEs tested against the current classification
Safety
class
FV limit CCDP
limit
Share of components
that would keep the
same SC
New count / old count of
components
SC2 7,97E-03 2,37E-02 36 % 43 %
SC3 8,51E-04 3,94E-04 23 % 208 %
EYT 5,93E-05 2,99E-05 52 % 158 %
The suggested upper limits for each safety class based on BEs and IEs are all rounded and
collected in Table 10.
Table 10 Suggested guiding limits for use in assistance of safety classification
Basic events Initiating events
Safety class ∑FV max(RAW,single) max(RAW,all) FV CCDP
SC2 - - - 1E-01 1E-02
SC3 1E-03 1,3 3,2 1E-03 5E-04
EYT 5E-05 1,1 1,2 5E-05 5E-05
If the level 2 RIM values were used instead and the upper limits were selected similarly, the
resulting upper limits would be the limits shown in Table 11. The RIMs whose value is
relative to the top event frequency would stay similar to the limits on level 1, but the CLRP
values would change by different factors. The top event frequency on level 2 is about half
of the top event frequency on level 1 which causes the differences. The changes are biggest
for SC2 for which the CLRP limit is only a tenth of the limit for CCDP values.
Table 11 Suggested guiding limits when RIM values from level 2 are used
Basic events Initiating events
Safety class ∑FV max(RAW,single) max(RAW,all) FV CLRP
SC2 - - - 1E-01 1E-03
SC3 1E-03 1,2 2,7 1E-03 1E-04
EYT 1E-04 1,1 1,2 1E-04 1E-05
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5.4 Discussion
There are multiple sources of error that affect the guiding limits defined in the previous
section. The PRA models themselves are not perfect representations of the actual NPP. The
models do not include every SSC and every relationship between the SSCs. It is possible
that all relevant accident sequences have yet not been identified. There are also multiple
assumptions made about how one event would lead to another, and multiple simplifications
in the calculation of event parameters. One example of a simplification used in Loviisa PRA
model is that some components in altering operation are assumed for modelling purposes to
be operated in such a way that one component is always in standby and the other is always
operating. The assumptions made in the calculation of different parameters are usually
conservative, but when considering the categorization, the different levels of conservativity
affect the relative rankings.
The upper limits for RIM values were determined separately for each RIM. This ignores the
possibility that a component can be very significant according to both FV and RAW, but the
value of neither exceeds the upper limits set for a safety class. Such a component can be
actually more significant than a component that is significant only according to one RIM,
but not the other. Therefore, attention should also be paid to components whose RIM values
are both close to the determined guiding limits. Some components can have an important
role in prevention of IEs from propagating into accidents while their failures can also cause
IEs with significant consequences. Combining the FV values of the BEs and IEs modelling
the component would increase the total FV values. This possibility was ignored from the
comparisons due to the BEs and IEs being handled separately and also because the IEs were
not associated with the exact KZ-IDs.
If a component is considered important according to the RIM values, changing the safety
class is not the only option to increase the safety of the plant. Depending on the RIM that is
considered high for the component, other adjustive measures could be taken. If the RAW or
CCDP values are high, then plant modifications could be added to increase the defence-in-
depth against failures of that individual component. If FV is high, then measures could be
taken to decrease the unavailability or failure rate of the component. For example, the
maintenance programs, inspections or allowed repair times can be adjusted according to the
component importance. Attention should also be paid to what kind of failures can cause the
component RIM values to exceed the limits and how much changing the safety class can
affect those failures. For example, if plant data is used for a component and none of the
previous failures are mechanical ones, it may not actually be sensible to increase the
mechanical safety class based on the data.
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6 Conclusions
The safety classes of SSCs and the RIMs that can be calculated for SSCs with PRA models
both measure the importance of an SSC. In this thesis the main objectives were to compare
the current safety classes of SSCs in a Finnish NPP to the RIM values of the same SSCs, and
to determine guiding values that can be used in assistance when new SSCs are added to the
plant and when the current SSCs are considered to be reclassified. A secondary objective
was to study the RIMs that can be currently calculated with RiskSpectrum PSA 1.3.2 or from
the calculated results and how they are currently used in safety classification.
Background information on nuclear power and nuclear safety were provided first and then
the safety classification in Finland was described. Then, the PRA methodology was
introduced with focus on the contents and quantification of a PRA model in order to provide
the necessary information required for understanding what the different RIMs measure and
how they are calculated. The different RIMs that can be calculated for BEs and IEs with
RiskSpectrum PSA 1.3.2 and the calculation and interpretation of the RIM values were then
introduced. It was found that all of the RIMs depend on the system configuration of the plant,
while some of them also depend on the probability or frequency of the event. Then, the
applications of RIMs to measure the importance of a whole component, or system or safety
function were discussed. The effect that the safety class has on the current RIM values was
also discussed, but it was concluded that there are multiple factors that affect the RIM values
and the direct dependence on safety class could not be identified.
Three RIMs were selected for the comparison: FV, RAW and CCDP. FV measures the
probability that the top was caused by an MCS that contains the component and the share of
top event frequency that is caused by MCSs that contains the component. RAW measures
the consequences of component unavailability as an increase in the top event frequency.
CCDP measures the conditional probability of top event given that the component causes an
IE. The comparisons were carried out for RIMs calculated for BEs and IEs separately.
Structures are generally not classified in Loviisa NPP. Therefore, the comparisons primarily
included components. A large share of internal IEs was found out to be used to model larger
entities than a single components. CCDP values were found to be equal for all the
components that can cause the same IE, but FV values had to be divided for the components.
In order to find out the approximate numbers of components that can cause the IE, and their
safety classes, the piping segments identified for RIISI were used in assistance. More
accurate comparisons based on IE RIMs could be carried out if it was better determined
which components can cause each IE and what is their actual share of the IE frequency.
The comparisons between safety classification and RIM values of components were carried
out by analyzing the components on different types of plots, through relative rankings and
based on the absolute values of the RIMs. It was found that safety classes are not completely
in line with the RIM values. For example, there are multiple EYT components whose RIM
values exceed the RIM values of SC2 components. This shows that there would be a lot of
opportunities to optimize the safety classes. However, the components from a high safety
class tend to have higher RIM values on average than components from the lower safety
classes. It was also found that SC1 are not more important than SC2 components according
to the RIMs calculated for BEs. The SC1 components are still more significant than SC2
components when analyzing IEs which are more related to structural failures. While each
safety class was found to contain components whose RIM values are close to the minimum
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value of the RIM, the maximums were found to be higher for higher safety classes for the
most part.
A suggestion for guiding values to be used in safety classification in order to comply with
the requirement set in YVL B.2 was then presented and tested against the current
classification. The guiding values were suggested to be used as upper limits for each safety
class. If the RIM value of the component or any component that the component has to have
the same safety class with exceeds the upper limit, then the component should be classified
to the above class. The upper limits were determined based on what kind of RIM values the
components currently in each class can have. They were tested against the current safety
classes of components by analyzing how the safety classes of components would change if
all components were classified based only on the RIM values. The suggested limits should
be used to give indication whether or not there is need from PRA perspective to safety
classify a component or to have the component in a higher safety class. PRA should not be
used as the only means to justify reducing the safety class of a component if the component
is required to be in a specific class according to YVL B.2 guidelines. PRA could also be
used to find components that could be candidates for reduction of the safety class, but every
case should be analyzed separately.
The suggested values were determined to be used within the current guidelines but
depending on the coverage and accuracy future PRA models, the safety classification in
Finland could be moved to be more based on the PRA. In an optimum situation the SSCs
with the highest RIM values would also be the ones in the highest safety classes. Or in order
to take the deterministic analyses also into account, something similar to the American risk-
informed safety categorization could be implemented where less significant safety classified
components would be subject to some easements regarding the requirements and more
significant EYT SSCs would have their requirements increased.
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Appendix 1 – Table 1 Criteria used to measure component significance collected in [71]
Decision case Criteria Acceptance or criticality values
Consequence
assessment of assumed
initiating event
CCDP >1E-4 high
1E-6…1E-4 medium
<1E-6 low
CLERP >1E-5 high
1E-7…1E-5 medium
<1E-7 low
Relative risk
significance
RAW >2 significant importance
>10 very safety severe
>1,05 safety severe
RRW
- System level
- Component
level
>1,05 significant importance
>1,005 significant importance
FV
- System level
- Component
level
>0,05 significant importance
>0,005 significant importance
Appendix 1 – Table 2 Criteria for different levels of safety significance according to [70]
Risk Significance Ranking Criteria
High safety significance RAW ≥ 100,0 or
FV ≥ 0,01 or
FV ≥ 0,005 and RAW ≥ 2,0
Medium (further evaluation required) FV < 0,005 and 100,0 > RAW ≥ 10,0
Medium safety significance FV ≥ 0,005 and RAW < 2,0 or
FV < 0,005 and 10,0 > RAW ≥ 2,0
Low safety significance FV <0,005 and RAW < 2,0
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